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RECENT DECISIONS
FEDERAL

JURISDICTIONTHREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURTS THREEJUDGE COURTS ARE NOT REQUIRED IN SUPREMACY CLAUSE CASES INVOLVING
ONLY FEDERAL-STATE STATUTORY CONFLICTS.The Swift and Armour Com-

panies, packers of frozen stuffed turkeys in Minnesota and Wisconsin, ship

their turkeys into New York State for sale to retailers who in turn resell them to
the general public. These turkeys are labeled in accordance with a federal

statute and Department of Agriculture regulations thereunder2 to indicate the
net weight of the turkey, including stuffing. A New York statute, as administratively interpreted, 3 required that such package bear a label indicating both the
weight of the turkey, excluding stuffing, as well as the weight of the entire
package. Swift and Armour, upon refusal of the Poultry Products Section of

the Department of Agriculture to allow them to change their labels in order to
conform with New York's requirements, requested a three-judge district court
be convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281.' They sought an injunction to restrain
enforcement of the New York law on the ground that it was violative of the
commerce clause and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In addition, due to overriding requirements of federal law, the New
York statute was alleged to violate the supremacy clause of the federal constitution. The District Court for the Southern District of New York, acting in both
a three-judge and single-judge capacity due to uncertainty as to its jurisdiction,
dismissed the complaint on its merits.5 Simultaneous appeals were executed to
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on the one-judge ruling and, under
28 U.S.C. § 1253, 6 to the United States Supreme Court on the three-judge
1 Poultry Products Inspection Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 441, 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-469 (1964).
2 The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized by § 463 to issue regulations. 7 C.F.R. §
81.125 (1959) requires containers to bear "approved labels"; 7 C.F.R. § 81.130(a) (3)
(Supp. 1965) declares that labels must include the net weight of the contents and that
"The net weight marked on containers of poultry products shall be the net weight of the
poultry products and shall not include the weights of the wet or dry packaging materials and
giblet wrapping materials."
3 N.Y. AoRrc. & MTS. LAW § 193(3) provides: "All food and food products offered
for sale at retail and not in containers shall be sold or offered for sale by net weight, standard
measure or numerical count under such regulations as may be prescribed by the commissioner."
Net weight was not defined in the regulations, 1 N.Y.C.R.R. § 221.40 (now § 221.9
(c)), but "[t]he Director of the Bureau of Weights and Measures of the Department testified
that he interpreted the regulation, as applied to stuffed turkeys, to require statement of the
net weight both of the unstuffed and of the stuffed bird, and that, when asked, he so
advised local sealers of weights and measures." Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 230 F. Supp. 398,
401 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). The reason advanced for such an interpretation was that it was an
aid to the consumer who was unsure of the exact amount of fowl included in a package,
since the amount of stuffing varied with each package.
4 37 Stat. 1013 (1913), 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964) provides:
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of
such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made
by an administrative board or commission acting under State statutes, shall not
be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined
by a district court of three judges under section 2284 of this title.
5 Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 230 F. Supp. 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
6 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964) provides:
Except as otherwise provided by law, arty party may appeal to the Supreme
Court from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory
or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any
Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.
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decision. The Supreme Court (Justices Douglas, Black, and Clark dissenting)
agreed with the district court that the commerce clause and fourteenth amendment claims were too insubstantial to support the jurisdiction of the three-judge
court, and held: a suit to enjoin the enforcement of a state law solely on the
ground of a supremacy clause violation was not within the scope of § 2281
(overruling Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety). Since the three-judge district court lacked jurisdiction under § 2281, no direct appeal lay to the Supreme
Court to consider the merits under § 1253. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S.
111 (1965).
Before reaching the merits in Wickham, the Court faced the threshold
question of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the case under the direct appeal
statute. ' This, in turn, depended upon whether a three-judge district court had
been, required to hear the case in the first instance. In considering the propriety
of convening the statutory panel, the Court first reviewed the history and purpose behind the three-judge requirement.
The three-judge statute -now
codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2281 -had
its
genesis as a result of congressional indignation over Ex parte Young.9 This case
held that a single federal judge could enjoin a state officer (and effectively the
state itself) from enforcing a state railroad-rate regulation statute which was
alleged to violate the due process clause of the federal constitution."0 The
implications of such a doctrine vesting so much power in a single federal judge
were not lost upon the states and the decision precipitated vehement debate in
the United States Senate." Many states had been experimenting with social
7 369 U.S. 153 (1962).
8 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964). See note 6 supra.
9 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
10 The Minnesota legislature in 1907 passed a law regulating railroad rates and providing
severe penalties for noncompliance. Stockholders of a number of railroads brought suit in
federal court to enjoin their companies from complying with this law on the basis that the
prescribed rates were confiscatory. They also prayed that Young, Attorney General of Minnesota, be restrained from enforcing the law. When Young refused to obey an order enjoinig enforcement of the railroad rate order on the grounds that the suit was in fact one
against the state in violation of the eleventh amendment, he was committed for contempt.
The Court held:
If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation of
the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes
into conflict with the superior authority of the Constitution, and he is in that case
stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person
to the consequences of his individual action.
209 U.S. at 159-60.
It is almost universally conceded that this decision rests on the purest of fictions. WRIGHT,
FEDERAL COURTS 160 (1963).
Yet the decision remains as a landmark in constitutional
adjudication. As one recent commentator surmised: "Behind the outlandish conceptual
justification concocted to support this holding lay the not implausible conviction that federal
constitutional rights could not be adequately protected without the intervention of federal
equity; therefore the philosophy of [state] immunity had to yield." Currie, The Three-judge
Distyict Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. Cm. L. Rav. 1, 4 (1964). See generally
Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending to Sue an Officer, 29 U. CHI. L. REv.
435 (1962).
11 For the congressional debates on the decision in Ex parte Young and the proposed
Three-Judge Act see 42 CONG. Rlc. 4846-59 (1908); 45 CONG. Ran. 7253-57 (1910).
Senator Overman of North Carolina stated:
Whenever one judge stands up in a State and enjoins the governor and the attorneygeneral, the people resent it, and public sentiment is stirred, as it was in my State,
when there was almost a rebellion, whereas if three judges declare that a state
statute is unconstitutional the people would rest easy under it. . . . The whole
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reform legislation, aimed primarily at the excessive rates charged by certain
railroad and public utility companies. 2 There followed in the wake of Young
a deluge of injunctions restraining the enforcement of these state statutes on
the grounds of their repugnancy to the due process and commerce clauses of
the federal constitution." The spectre of federal interference with important
state legislation was viewed with genuine alarm by the states. Not only did
injunctions issue in the discretion of individual federal trial judges, but often
these judges insisted upon reading their own economic theories into the due
process and commerce clauses. 4 If there was to be a confrontation between
the due process clause and state regulatory legislation, federal district courts
were thought improper arenas and single federal judges were thought improper
referees. Some restrictions on federal judicial power were thought necessary to
placate the states.
It was in this atmosphere of federal-state tension that the three-judge statute
was enacted in 1910." Its purpose was "to provide a more responsible forum
for the litigation of suits which, if successful, would render void state statutes
embodying important state policies."' 6 Viewed as an instrument to guard
against the "improvident state-wide doom by a federal court of a state's legislative policy,"'" the Three-Judge Act - a political as well as a procedural statute
was a deferential bow to state sovereignty.'" Under its terms, in any suit
seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a state statute, "upon the ground of the
purpose of the proposed statute is for peace and good order among the people of
the States.
45 CONG. REc. 7256 (1910).
Commenting on the Young decision, Senator Bacon of Georgia stated:
. . . the decision trampled upon the rights of the State of Minnesota, and I may
add that if it trampled upon the rights of the State of Minnesota, it necessarily
trampled upon the rights of every other State ....
If these subordinate courts can exercise such power, then, indeed, the States
are but provinces and dependencies.
42 CONG. REC. 4853 (1908).
12 See generally Currie, note 10 supra at 3-9; Hutcheson, A Case for Three Judges, 47
HAv. L. Rav. 795, 803-05 (1934); Comment, The Three-Judge Federal Court In Constitutional Litigation: A Procedural Anachronism, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 555, 557-58 (1960).
13 See, e.g., Louisiana R.R. Comm'n v. Cumberland Tel. Co., 212 U.S. 414 (1909);
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908). See also Roach v. Atchison, T. &
S.F. Ry., 218 U.S. 159 (1910); Herndon v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 218 U.S. 135 (1910).
14 "[The Three-Judge Act] was enacted to remedy a well-known evil, viz. the activities
of sovereign states too frequently enjoined by a single judge too prone to sign on the dotted
line upon the request of public utilities." Northern P. Ry. v. Board of R.R. Comm'rs., 34
F.2d 295, 297 (D.Mont. 1929).
15 As a compromise measure, Congress enacted Senator Overman's bill which prohibited
the issuance of an interlocutory injunction against a state statute upon grounds of federal
unconstitutionality unless the application for injunction was heard and determined by a
district court of three judges. It was passed as an appendage to the Mann-Elkins Railroad
Act, Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 557 (1910) which was later codified as
§ 266 of the Judicial Code, 36 Stat. 1162 (1911). This statute was amended in 1913 to
include orders of state administrative boards and commissions, 28 U.S.C. § 2281, (1964)
and in 1925 to include applications for permanent as well as interlocutory injunctions, 28
U.S.C. § 2281 (1964).
16 Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 119 (1965). See congressional debates supra
note 11, Professor Moore calls the Three-Judge Act a "Congressional restriction upon federal
judicial power for the purpose of preventing undue collision with state legislative action."
IA MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 0.205 (2d ed. 1965).
17 Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 251 (1941).
18 Hutcheson, supra note 12 at 811. See Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S.
368, 379 (1949).
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unconstitutionality of such statute," a statutory panel of three judges was to be
convened to determine the controversy. As a further safeguard, an accelerated
appeal could be taken directly to the Supreme Court from an order granting
or denying the injunction. Such a scheme was thought to provide less opportunity for individual predilection in sensitive and politically emotional areas.' 9
Thus, § 2281 and its predecessors are not to be viewed as mere technical rules
of procedure. Indeed, the impact of this statute probes the very heart of the
federal system and affects the allocation of power between the federal and state
governments.2"
As one court aptly noted, "the principles in regard to the convening of a
court of three judges have been clearly stated but are not too simple in application." 1 These "clearly stated" prerequisites of § 2281 are: an interlocutory or
permanent injunction must be sought; such injunction must seek to restrain
the action of a state officer or administrative agency; the action sought to be
enjoined must involve the enforcement of some state statute; and finally, the
injunction must be sought on the ground of the alleged unconstitutionality of
the state statute.22 Since convocation of a three-judge court involves a serious
drain of judicial manpower,2" the federal courts have long engaged in a process
of limiting the reach of § 2281 by a restrictive construction of the statutory
language. Thus, the Supreme Court in Phillips v. United States24 stated that
the three-judge procedure is not to be viewed "as a measure of broad social
policy to be construed with great liberality, but as an enactment technical in
the strict sense of the term and to be applied as such."2 5 To implement this
technical construction of the statute, federal courts have developed a number
of control devices. Chief among these are the requirements that a three-judge
court need not be convened if the claim of unconstitutionality is wholly insubstantial 26 or if prior decisions make it clear that the state statute is patently
unconstitutional.
19 See congressional debates, supra note 11. The device of a court of special dignity,
with expedited review was not an innovation. A 1903 Act, 32 Stat. 823 (1903), had utilized
three-judges for certain antitrust cases certified by the Attorney General to be of general
public importance, and a 1906 Act, 34 Stat. 584, 592 (1906), applied it to any suit brought
to restrain, set aside, or annul an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Congress
borrowed this scheme and made it applicable to suits in which an interlocutory injunction
was sought against the enforcement of state statutes by state officials. HART & WECHSLER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm 849 (1953); WRIGHT, op. Cit. supra note
10, at 162-63.
20 WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 10 at 157.
21 Webb v. State Univ. of New York, 120 F. Supp. 554, 558 (N.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 867 (1954).
22

See generally 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§

52 (rev.

ed. 1960); IA MooRE, op. cit. supra note 16, § 0.205; WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 10, §§

48, 50.

23 Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 250 (1941). See generally note, The Threejudge Court In Constitutional Litigation: A Procedural Anachronism 27 U. Cm. L. R!v.
555, 563-64 (1960); note, The Three-judge District Court And Appellate Review 49 VA.
L. Rnv. 538, 545-46 (1963). But see Currie, supra note 10, at 11-12; note, The Three-judge
Distiict Court: Scope and Procedure Under Section 2281, 77 HAv. L. Rxv. 299, 305 (1963).
24 312 U.S. 246 (1941).
25 Id. at 251.
26 California Water Serv. Co. v. Redding, 304 U.S. 252 (1938); Ex parte Poresky,
290 U.S. 30 (1933).
27 Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962) '(per curiam).
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A further restriction on the jurisdiction of three-judge courts developed in
the area of so-called "supremacy clause" cases - a restriction difficult to explain
in light of the policy considerations behind § 2281. Although the Court, in
FloridaLime Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen," stated that "Section 2281 seems rather
plainly to indicate a congressional intention to require an application for an
injunction to be heard and determined by a court of three judges in any case
in which the injunction may be granted on grounds of federal unconstitutionality,"2 9 there remained some uncertainty as to the need for three judges
when it was argued that a state law conflicted with a federal statute. This is
the problem which confronted the Court in Wickham. They were called upon
to decide the scope of the phrase "upon the ground of the unconstitutionality
of such statute" when a complaint under § 2281 alleges not the traditional due
process, equal protection, commerce, or contract clause arguments, but rather
that the state statute or regulation in question is pre-empted by or in conflict
with some federal statute or regulation thereunder."0
Any claim of pre-emption or statutory conflict is grounded in the supremacy
clause of the constitution." Since § 2281 speaks of "unconstitutionality," it
would appear that a supremacy clause complaint would fall within the ambit

of cases intended to be covered by that section. Thus, when a three-judge district court made the first known classification of a supremacy clause claim in
1921, they found that supremacy clause cases were properly within the purview
of § 266 of the Judicial Code, the predecessor of § 2281. " However, this reasoning was rejected in a series of Supreme Court cases which construed the threejudge statute to mean that the statutory panel was required only when a state
statute was alleged to be in conflict with some section of the Constitution other
than the supremacy clause.33 The rationale behind such holdings was that com28
29
30
31

362 U.S. 73 (1960).
Id. at 76-77.
Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 120 (1965).
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

U.S. CONST. art. VI.

32

This injunction is not sought "upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such
statute," in the more common sense in which we speak of unconstitutionality. That
there is a conflict between state and federal law does not always bring to mind the
issue of the unconstitutionality of the former; yet it is prescribed by the federal
Constitution that it and the laws and treaties made in pursuance thereof shall be
the supreme law of the land, and it seems to follow that a state statute which is
in conflict with a federal statute, when the latter is pursuant to and within the
power given by the federal Constitution, is, in a very fair sense, unconstitutional.
We think the present situation is fully within the spirit and fairly within the letter
of section 266, and that the court, as now constituted, has power to hear and
determine the application.
Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Michigan Pub. Util. Comm'n, 271 Fed. 319, 321 (E.D.Mich. 1921).
33 Each case built upon its predecessor(s) and thus the cases must be considered in
chronological sequence. The first case perennially cited to support the proposition that
three judges are not required in supremacy clause cases, Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co., 258
U.S. 50 (1922), did so by implication. A three-judge district court had granted a temporary injunction against the enforcement of a state statute on the dual grounds that it
violated the commerce clause and a federal statute. Jurisdiction of the circuit court of appeals
was sustained on the ground that the claim of conflict between the statutes gave the court
a ground for jurisdiction, independent of the commerce clause claim, which standing alone

RECENT DECISIONS
plaints alleging only a conflict between state and federal statutes involved mere
matters of statutory construction rather than constitutional adjudication and
hence the statutory panel was not required."
It is submitted that the Supreme Court failed to give proper consideration
in these cases to the nature of the supremacy clause claim in relation to the
policy considerations behind the three-judge procedure." Although he felt constrained to dismiss the case in favor of the "settled rule," Judge Friendly averred
to these deeper considerations in his opinion in Bell v. Waterfront Commn"s
when he stated:
would have given the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction of the appeal. The Supreme
Court held:
The attack upon the state statute because of its repugnancy to the federal
statute required a consideration and construction of both statutes, and their application to the facts found. These considerations presented a ground of jurisdiction
arising under a law of the United States, and was not dependent solely upon the
application and construction of the Federal Constitution.
258 U.S. at 53.
Ex parte Buder, 271 U.S. 461 (1926), is also cited as authority for the proposition
that a claim of conflict between state and federal statutes involves mere matters of statutory
construction rather than direct attacks upon the constitutionality of the state statute within
the purview of § 2281. A unanimous Court held the case was not properly one for three
judges "because no state statute was assailed as being repugnant to the Constitution." 271
U.S. at 465. The Court said, "the claim that the tax is void rests, not upon a contention
that the state statute under which it was laid is unconstitutional, but upon a contention that
the statute is no longer in force." Id. at 466. Although the complaint in Buder did not
explicitly invoke the supremacy clause, the defendant's answer alluded to it. Swift & Co.
v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 121 (1965).
The most oft-quoted statement of the supremacy clause exception appeared in Ex parte
Bransford, 310 U.S. 354 (1940), a case which, like Buder, was an attempt to enjoin the
collection of a state tax on national bank shares. The Court, in holding three judges unnecessary, stated:
If such assessments are invalid, it is because they levy taxes upon property
withdrawn from taxation by federal law or in a manner forbidden by the National
Banking Act. The declaration of the supremacy clause 'ves superiority to valid
federal acts over conflicting state statutes but this superiority for present purposes
involves merely the construction of an act of Congress, not the constitutionality of
the state enactment.
310 U.S. at 358-59. (Emphasis added.)
The Court cited the Buder and Lemke cases as authority for this proposition.
In Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946), the Court said ". . . the complaint [requesting
an injunction against a state statute] did not challenge the constitutionality of the state
statute but alleged merely that its enforcement would -violate the Emergency Price Control
Act. Consequently a three-judge court is not required." 327 U.S. at 97. Bransford was
cited as authority.
Finally, in Florida Lime Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73 (1960), the majority held
that if a state statute was sought to be enjoined on constitutional grounds (commerce clause,
equal protection clause), it did not matter that a "nonconstitutional" ground (pre-emption by
the Federal Agriculture- Marketing Agreement Act) was also asserted. Thus, by implication,
an attack upon a state statute on the grounds of its inconsistency with a federal statute was
held to be a "nonconstitutional" ground of attack.
The rule that supremacy clause cases were not within the purview of § 2281 was followed in a great number of cases. For a complete list of such cases prior to Florida Lime
Growers, see Annot., 4 L.Ed.2d 1931, 1962-65 (1960).
34 Ibid.
35 One commentator persuasively argues that the Lemke case involved an "incomplete
analysis" of the supremacy clause issue and that such incomplete analysis has been seized
upon and consistently followed in subsequent cases. This "incomplete analysis" was the
bedrock upon which such cases as Buder and Bransford were decided and which ultimately
became the crystallized manner for interpreting § 2281. 15 STAN. L. Rv. 565, 569 n. 23
(1963. Accord, Note, Three-Judge Court Practice Under Section 2281, 53 GEo. L.J. 431,
445 (1965).
36 279 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1960).
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. .. the invalidity of state action derives from the supremacy clause, Article
VI, whether the conflict is with the Constitution or with "Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof"; and the evil
at which § 2281 was directed would seem the same whether state action
is sought to be enjoined as conflicting with a Federal statute or with the
Constitution itself.37 (Emphasis added.)
A conflict between state and federal statutes involves a direct conflict between
the particular state statute and the federal Constitution. The basis for the complaint in such a case is the constitutional argu.ment that the supremacy clause
recognizes the federal law as pre-empting the field and thus excludes state
regulation designed to impede its operation. 8 Thus, given the presuppositions
of the Three-Judge Act and the fact that an injunction in a supremacy clause
case disrupts state action as much as an injunction on any other ground, there
appears little justification for the supremacy clause exception.
Nonetheless, the supremacy clause exception to § 2281 remained unquestioned until 1962 when the Supreme Court decided Kesler v. Department of
Pub. Safety. 9 The complaint in Kesler sought to enjoin the enforcement of a
state financial responsibility law on the ground that it conflicted with a provision of the Federal Bankruptcy Act which allegedly pre-empted the field. A
three-judge district court denied injunctive relief4" and appeal was taken directly
to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was thus squarely faced with the
question of whether a supremacy clause case might properly be heard by a
three-judge court. In refusing to dismiss the case for lack of a constitutional
issue, although the complaint alleged solely a supremacy clause claim, the Court
went to the jugular vein when it stated: "Neither the language of § 2281 nor
the purpose which gave rise to it affords the remotest reason for carving out
an unfrivolous claim of unconstitutionality because of the Supremacy Clause
from the comprehensive language of § 2281 .' ' 4 But then, rather than expressly
rejecting the cases supporting the supremacy clause exception, 42 the Court
formulated an anomalous rule which sought to dilute the supremacy clause
exception while avoiding its express repudiation. 41 The Court distinguished
Kesler from the earlier cases, Ex parte Buder,4" Ex parte Bransford,3 and Case
v. Bowles,4" on the ground that these cases involved preliminary matters of
statutory construction whereas Kesler presented a "sole, immediate constitutional question.""7
Kesler, in expanding the jurisdiction of the three-judge statute to reach
some supremacy clause cases, was a definitive break from the restrictive language
employed in the earlier decisions. However, Kesler's "immediate controversy"
37

Id. at 858.

43

Note, Three-Judge Court Practice Under Section 2281, 53 GEo. L. J. 431, 446 (1965).

38
39
40
41
42

Comment, 61 Micn. L. REv. 1528, 1535 (1963).
369 U.S. 153 (1962).
In re Kesler, 187 F. Supp. 277 (D. Utah 1960).
Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 156 (1962).
See text accompanying notes 33, 34 supra.

44 271 U.S. 461 (1926).
45 310 U.S. 354 (1940).
46 327 U.S. 92 (1946).
47 369 U.S. 153, 158 (1962).
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test has received a great deal of criticism on the ground that such a rule is
"plainly unworkable."
The ink had hardly dried on the Court's opinion in
Kesler when the rule it had formulated came before the Court for critical reexamination in Wickham.
The three-judge district court in Swift & Co. v. Wickham," after dismissing the commerce clause and the fourteenth amendment claims as too
insubstantial to support its jurisdiction,"0 was left with a complaint which sought
to enjoin enforcement of the state law solely on the basis of its alleged repugnancy

to the federal statute. Thus, the question of whether a court of three judges
was required to hear the case under § 2281 turned upon the proper application
of the Kesler decision. The district court, speaking through Judge Friendly,
noted that Kesler had laid down "a very subtle rule" in supremacy clause cases
dealing with federal statutory pre-emption and conflict between state and federal
law."' However, the district court was uncertain as to the proper application
of that rule in the situation before it. 2 Due to this uncertainty as to its jurisdiction, the court dismissed the complaint, "certifying out of abundant caution"
that the original district judge, a member of the statutory panel, "individually
arrived at the same conclusion."5 "
48 Id. at 178 (dissenting opinion). The Kesler rule has been critically denounced in a
number of law review articles, e.g., Currie, supra note 10, at 61-64 (1964); Note, ThreeJudge Court Practice Under Section 2281, 53 Gao. L. J. 431, 444-48 (1965): Note, The
Three-Judge District Court: Scope And Procedure Under Section 2281, 77 HLv. L. Ray.
299, 313-15 (1963); Note, The Three-Judge District Court And Appellate Review, 49 VA.
L. REv. 538, 553-55 (1963); 76 HAv. L. Rav. 168 (1962); 15 STAN. L. REv. 565 (1963);
1962 U. ILL. L. FORuM 467; 111 U. PA. L. REv. 113 (1962). It has been argued that the
opinion in Kesler "refutes the very test which it establishes." Kesler v. Department of Pub.
Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 177 (1962) (dissenting opinion). After declaring that no issue of
statutory construction was involved in the case, the Court devoted seventeen pages to an
examination of the state statute and the Federal Bankruptcy Act before holding an injunction
was proper.
49 230 F. Supp. 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
50 The Supreme Court agreed with this finding. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S.
111, 114-15 (1965). See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
51 Swift & Co. v. 'Wickham, 230 F. Supp. 398, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). The court was
quoting from WiUorT, op. cit. supra note 10, at 164-65:
It was commonly supposed for years that the three-judge court statute does
not apply where the claim is that a state statute conflicts with a federal statute
which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, is controlling. The Supreme Court has
qualified the cases which seemed to so hold with a very subtle rule. The earlier
cases are explained on the theory that they involved a question of statutory construction as to the federal statute which had to be resolved before the Supremacy
Clause came into effect, and it is held that if' the case presents a sole immediate
constitutional question as to the effect of the Supremacy Clause, and does not
require preliminary construction of the federal statute, a three-judge court must be
summoned (citing Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety).
52 Finding itself unable to say with assurance whether its resolution of the merits of
this case involved less statutory construction than had taken place in Kesler, the district
court was left with the puzzling question how much more statutory construction than occurred
in Kesler is necessary to deprive three judges of their jurisdiction.
Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 115 (1965).
53 230 F. Supp. 398, 410 (1964). Although a single district judge is without power to
act in a case requirng three judges, the opposite is not true. Phillips v. United States, 312
U.S. 246, 254 (1941); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Brashear Lines, Inc., 312 U.S. 621, 626
(1941). The only consequence of erroneous retention of jurisdiction by a three-judge c6urt
is that the appeal should be taken to the Court of Appeals rather than to the Supreme
Court. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962) (per curiam). Thus, the court in Swift
thought the plaintiffs could adequately protect themselves against the uncertainty of the

district court's

jurisdiction by timely appeals to both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme

Court. 230 F. Supp. at 410. Granted this may be true, such a procedure is cumbersome in
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At this point, the Supreme Court was called upon to re-examine its holding in Kesler in view of the difficulty its rule presented to the lower federal
courts." Three years of sad experience with the rule had borne out Chief
Justice Warren's prediction in his dissenting opinion in Kesler that the rule was
"plainly unworkable."5 5 The Court candidly admitted that they found the
"application of the Kesler rule as elusive as did the District Court."5 6 Since
Kesler involved an important procedural principle, the Court reasoned that
stare decisis did not constrain them to keep such a rule on the books once it
proved unworkable in practice; thus the Court declared that Kesler should be
pro tanto overruled."
In explicating their reasons for overturning such a recent decision, the
Court seized upon the opportunity to reinterpret § 2281. Two alternatives were
presented to the Court. They could either adopt a broad view of § 2281 which
would extend the Kesler holding to all suits to enjoin the enforcement of a state
statute, whatever the federal ground; or they could adopt a restrictive view
that no suits resting solely on "supremacy" grounds fall within the statute.58
Valid considerations would support the adoption of either view. For this
reason the Court set out and weighed the various arguments for each side before
reaching its decision to adopt the more restrictive view.5" The broader reading
of § 2281 commended itself as being more straightforward since courts could
determine the necessity for a statutory tribunal solely by looking at the relief
sought rather than distinguishing among different constitutional grounds. Similarly, when an injunction was sought on several grounds (as in Wickham) the
proper composition of the court would not depend upon whether certain alleged
constitutional grounds of attack proved insubstantial. Secondly, a broad view
of § 2281 was clearly consistent with the statutory language. Finally, some
policy considerations would support the broader view. State citizens and officials are just as likely to take offense at the voiding of state legislation on
grounds of conflict with a federal statute as they would in a suit alleging direct
conflict with the United States Constitution.
However, the Court found that a more restrictive reading of § 2281,
though not compelled by the statutory language, was not an inappropriate
reading of the statute. Such an interpretation was thought to be most consistent with the statute's structure, pre-Kesler precedent, and the section's historical
purpose." Finally, the restrictive interpretation was viewed as justified by sound
unduly cluttering the dockets of two high courts of review. It is also contrary to the avowed
purpose of § 2281, to expedite litigation. Decision on the merits ought not be postponed
while the proper composition of the district court is litigated.
54 The Court noted that in Borden Co. v. Liddy, 309 F.2d 871, 874 (8th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 953 (1963) and American Travelers Club, Inc. v. Hostetter, 219 F.
Supp. 95, 1U2, n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), the courts sought to avoid dealing with Kesler's application. In a case in which the court did interpret Kesler, Bartlett & Co. v. State Corp.
Comm'n, 223 F. Supp. 975, 980 (D.Kan. 1963), it did so with uncertainty.
55 Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 178 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
56 Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965).
57 Ibid.
58 Id. at 125.
59 These arguments will be summarized infra. For an elaboration of the Court's arguments, see 382 U.S. at 125-26 (1965).
60 Id. at 128.
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policy considerations. With an eye toward ease of judicial administration, the
Court was persuaded to return to the traditional Buder-Bransford-Caserule."1
Such a constrictive interpretation of § 2281 was believed justified on the ground
that it would make for the more efficient operation of the lower federal courts.
Little issue can be taken with Wickham's rejection of the Kesler rule.
The rule is patently unsupportable. Mr. Justice Frankfurter was attempting
to do the impossible in Kesler. He sought to condemn the supremacy clause
exception to § 2281 while simultaneously avoiding an express repudiation of the
cases which gave rise to it. To do this, Frankfurter carved out a counterexception to the supremacy clause exception in framing his "immediate controversy" test. 2 Precedent was distinguished as involving preliminary matters
of statutory construction. However, the rule Frankfurter formulated refutes the
very test which it establishes since it is difficult to conceive of any pre-emption
case which "would not call for an initial interpretation of the legislation or an
inquiry into its purpose or policy before a court could determine if the state
and federal statutes are in conflict." 3 Frankfurter's attempt in Kesler to harmonize with precedent while allowing some supremacy clause cases to come
within the ambit of § 2281 resulted in a test which just would not work.
Thus, the Wickham decision was clearly correct in rejecting the Kesler rule
as a test in the supremacy clause area. However, Wickham did more than strike
down a complicated and confused procedural rule; it attacked the basic premise
of the Kesler decision, viz. that some supremacy clause cases are worthy of a
three-judge court. 4 Although the rule Kesler formulated may have been a
poor one, it is submitted that its basic premise was nonetheless sound and hence
Wickham incorrectly returned to a restrictive construction of § 2281.
The Wickham rule that supremacy clause cases are not within the purview
of § 2281, though easier in application than the Kesler rule, avoids the basic
problem to which Kesler addressed itself. That basic question is: Is it a sound
idea to eliminate supremacy clause cases from the scope of § 2281? Kesler's
answer was that an unfrivolous claim of unconstitutionality based on the supremacy clause ought not be carved out from the comprehensive language of
§ 2281. 3 The Court in Wickham was more concerned with striking down
Kesler's "unworkable" rule than in probing the deeper question of the basic
premise behind such a rule. The majority's position in Wickham - rejecting
all supremacy clause cases- is one solution, but not the best solution.
Mr. Justice Douglas' dissenting remarks appear to address themselves to
the deeper issue involved in the case. Kesler turned upon whether a challenge
based on the supremacy clause stood on any different grounds than a challenge
based on any other provision of the Constitution. Kesler decided that it did not.
Given the language of § 2281, an issue based on the "unconstitutionality" of a
state statute can be just as clearly raised by a conflict between a state statute
61 Id. at 126.
62 Note, The Three-Judge District Court: Scope And Procedure Under Section 2281,
77 HARv. L. REv. 299, 313 (1963).
63 Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 176 (1962) (dissenting opinion
of Warren, C.J.).
64- See text accompanying note 41 supra.
65 369 U.S. 153, 156 (1962).
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and a federal law as by a conflict between a state statute and any other provision of the Constitution.66 The Wickham majority would render the supremacy
clause a "second-class citizen" of the Constitution if their view prevails that
a supremacy clause attack is not a constitutional attack within the meaning of
"unconstitutionality" in § 2281. There appear to be no reasonable grounds
for not according the supremacy clause equal dignity with the due process, equal
protection, commerce, or contracts clauses - all of which have been held to
support a claim of unconstitutionality within the scope of § 2281.
The Wickham majority also felt that cases involving alleged incompatibility between state and federal statutes do not involve the same serious problems
of federalism which gave rise to the original three-judge statute and hence that
the statutory tribunal is not needed in such cases. 7 History clearly refutes this
argument. Some of the most heated controversies in constitutional adjudication have involved conflicts between state and federal statutes.6 " At first blush,
a controversy over conflicting state and federal regulations dealing with the
labeling of stuffed turkeys seems an insignificant case, hardly worthy of a court
of three judges. However, pre-emption or conflict of a state law with a federal
law is a constantly recurring problem which arises in a variety of contexts.6 9
When a single federal judge grants injunctive relief against the operation of
a state statute in such a case, utilizing the supremacy clause as the basis for
requiring the state statute to give way, that injunction is just as efficacious in
bringing a halt to an entire state regulatory scheme as in cases where substantive
due process grounds are advanced.
The Three-Judge Act, if it is to serve any useful purpose, must be acclimated
to the times. Federal interference with state regulation of railroads and public
utilities may be a thing of the past, but such problems as racial discrimination,
legislative apportionment, and even the labeling of stuffed turkeys are their
modem day counterparts, raising like problems of state dignity." The same
delicate problems of federalism are at issue. The three-judge procedure was
enacted to preserve the fine balance inherent in federal-state relations, guaranteeing to the states reasonable freedom in their local affairs, while preserving
66 Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 129 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
67 Id. at 127. The thesis that the controversies three-judge courts were designed to meet
are largely a thing of the past has received a great deal of law review treatment. E.g., Note,
The Three-Judge Federal Court in Constitutional Litigation: A Procedural Anachronism,
27 U. COH. L. Rav. 555 (1960); 15 STmr. L. REv. 565, 573 (1963). See also HART &
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 848-54 (1953).
But see,
note, The Three-Judge District Court: Scope And Procedure Under Section 2281, 77 HRv.
L. REv. 299, 303 (1963).
68 The earliest known case is Cohens v. Virginia 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), the
famous lottery case, in which a law of Virginia and an Act of Congress came into conflict.
69 Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 131 (1965) (dissenting opinion). See e.g.,
Cloverleaf Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942), where a federal court injunction in a
pre-emption case suspended Alabama's program for control of renovated butter. The dissent
in this case called the decision in favor of pre-emption "purely destructive legislation." Id.
at 179. For other pre-emption cases, see Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961); Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); General Elec. Co. v. Callahan, 294 F.2d
60 (1st Cir. 1961), petition for cert. dismissed, 369 U.S. 832 (1962); Williams v. Ball, 294
F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1961); Bell v. 'Waterfront Comm'n, 279 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1960).
70 Note, The Three-Judge District Court: Scope And Procedure Under Section 2281, 77
HRv. L. Rxv. 299, 303 (1963).
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constitutional rights."

The decade of the 1960's is an era in which the federal

government is increasingly advancing into areas heretofore within the exclusive
domain of the states. In a very real sense the fruitful areas for conflict in the

future would appear to be in the area of federal pre-emption, claims grounded
in the supremacy clause. Since the resolution of these conflicts between state
and federal statutes involve the same problems of federalism encountered in

other constitutional adjudication which gave birth to the Three-Judge Act,
there is no reason in either history or policy for denying the statutory panel in
such cases. It is submitted that in holding that three-judge courts are not
required in supremacy clause cases involving only federal-state statutory conflicts, the Supreme Court in Swift & Co. v. Wickham unduly returned to a
restrictive reading of § 2281, inconsistent with that statute's language, history,
and purpose.
Stephen R. Lamantia
INSURANCE LAW - CANCELLATION - TO CANCEL AN AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY POLICY, NOTICE MUST BE BOTH GIVEN AND EFFECTIVE WITHIN THE
PERIOD DURING WHICH

CANCELLATION

IS

PERMITTED WITHOUT

CAUSE.

-

Mr. Ross Langdon heard a loud crash in front of his home. He went out,
found his own automobile undamaged, and reported to a passing police officer
that an automobile in the vicinity must have been struck. Mr. Langdon assisted
the owner of the damaged vehicle and telephoned the police for her. At a
hearing where he appeared against the motorist, it was discovered that Mr.
Langdon was mistakenly listed as the owner of the damaged automobile. Subsequently, he was informed that his license was to be suspended for failure to
file an accident report. Langdon later learned that his automobile insurance
had been cancelled and that he had been placed in the Assigned Risk Pool.'
His policy provided:
16 .... This policy may be canceled by the company by mailing to the
insured ... at the address shown in this policy written notice stating when
not less than ten days thereafter such cancelation shall be effective. The
mailing of notice as aforesaid shall be sufficient proof of notice. The time
of the ... effective date and hour of cancelation stated in the notice shall
become the end of the policy period.
17 .... After this policy has been in effect for sixty days .. .the com-2
pany shall not exercise its right to cancel the insurance [except for cause].
The policy was issued July 6, 1964 for a one year period. On August 31, 1964
a cancellation notice was sent which stated that the policy is "hereby CANCELLED as of 12:01 A.M. the 10 day of September, 1964."' On appeal
71 Note, The Three-Judge District Court And Appellate Review, 49
545 (1963).
1
p. 2.
2
(D.C.
3

VA. L. Rlv. 538,

Langdon v. Maryland Cas. Co., 357 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Brief for Appellant,
Brief for Appellant, p. 5 '(joint appendix), Langdon v. Maryland Cas. Co., 357 F.2d 819
Cir. 1966).
Langdon v. Maryland Cas. Co., 357 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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from a judgment finding the cancellation effective, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held: the phrase
"exercises its right to cancel" refers to the date when coverage under the policy
actually ceases and, since this occurred more than sixty days after the issuance
of the policy, the cancellation was invalid and of no effect. Langdon v. Maryland Cas. Co., 357 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Cancellation of insurance policies is an old and honorable subject. The
fundamental principle is that insurance is a contract and it is to be governed
by the terms of the policy. It is, however, a special type of contract and courts
have interpreted it most strictly against the insurance company.4 This is not
only because the company wrote the policy, but also because the insured is
commonly thought helpless in the face of standardized contracts. Due deference
is given to the great loss that is possible if an individual is deprived of insurance
protection.5
The ramifications of adherence to a policy of strictly interpreting insurance
contracts are manifest in the allowable methods of cancellation. At common
law, insurance companies had a right to terminate coverage eo instanti. Most
policies today contain a clause specifying that cancellation is effective only after
a notice has been given and five, ten, twenty or thirty days have passed. Frequently, this is in response to a statute requiring a specified number of days
pass before cancellation will be effective.' The rationale of a provision requiring
such a period recently was expressed:
Cancellation of an insurance contract, upon which the insured is relying
for protection, is drastic action, and the requirement of five days' notice
is obviously to enable the insured to secure insurance protection from
some other company.7
A problem which frequently arises in the cancellation of automobile liability
policies is the form and sufficiency of the cancellation notice.' The context in
which this problem usually arises is where an attempt is made to cancel and
the company gives the five- or ten-day notice period prescribed in the policy.
However, the period of time given does not satisfy the terms of the policy since
4 E.g., Farmers Mut. Hail Ins. Co. v. Minton, 279 S.W.2d 523 (Mo. App. 1955);
Griffin v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Co., 94 Ohio App. 403, 116 N.E.2d 41 (1953);
Brewer v. Maryland Cas. Co., 245 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). See 6 APPLEBIAN,
INSURANCE LAW AND PACTICE § 4181 (1942, Supp. 1965) (strict compliance with the
terms of the policy is necessary). But see Kuvin, Misconstruction of Insurance Policies, 433
INS. L. J. 102 (1959) (arguing that courts have failed to interpret policies as written).
5 The policy provisions in Langdon represent a significant, self-imposed limitation on
the part of the insurance company. Previously, cancellation without cause was possible provided the requisite notice was given and premiums were returned. Now, after sixty days,
the policy in Langdon is incontestable except for cause or acts leading to the suspension of
a driver's license. See Young, Insurance Contracts: The Discontinuance Question, 30 INs.
COUNSEL J. 146, 150 (1963).
6 See, E.g., LA. Rlv. STAT. § 22:636 (1959) (provides a five-day notice period and
makes proper deposit in the mail sufficient). N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 313 (cancellation clause provision of the New York Compulsory Insurance Law). See also D. C. CODE §
35-712 (1961) (applying to sickness and accident policies, a five-day period with mailing
is sufficient).
7 Columbia Cas. Co. v. Wright, 235 F.2d 462, 464 (4th Cir. 1956).
8 See 8 APPLEMAN, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 5012-5015; 6 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF
INSURANCE LAW

§§ 1439, 1442 (1930, Supp. 1965).
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the company erroneously counts the first day,9 or counts from the day of mailing

instead of from the day of receipt,"0 or includes a Sunday or Holiday in the
time,1" or attempts to make cancellation effective immediately.' 2 The majority
response to such a mistake gives effect to the cancellation notice:

The rule is well settled in this and other jurisdictions, that, when the
notice declares that thd cancellation is presently operative, or fixes a time
shorter than that prescribed, where the policy requires a certain number
of days'3 notice, it becomes effective at the expiration of the prescribed
period.'
The reason courts have allowed coverage to terminate after the full period of
time has passed is that "the mischief sought to be remedied was that resulting
from terminating the policy without according the assured ample time within
which to negotiate for other insurance in its stead."' 4 Thus, when the time
specified in the policy expires, coverage can be terminated without any real
detriment to the insured. This majority response provides the first key concept
necessary to an understanding of the Langdon decision: the purpose of the
ten-day notice is solely to enable the insured to obtain other protection and
coverage terminates at the end of ten full days.
Not all courts have followed this majority view. At the other end of the
spectrum, courts look closely at the contract provision. They hold the notice
provision to be a condition precedent requiring strict compliance by the insurer.
Pennsylvania has held that where a notice was given at 6 P.M. in the evening
and cancellation was to take effect at 12:01 A.M. nine days later, the cancellation was ineffective and the policy remained in force since the company
fell six hours short of compliance with the ten-day requirement. 5 South Carolina followed this approach and held that a notice which provided only four
of the five required days was ineffective.'" A third state accepting the minority
approach that inexact cancellation has no effect, even on the expiration of the
correct number of days, is Maryland. The court, in Langdon, held that the
law of Maryland was to apply since it was the same as the law of the District
of Columbia.'
In American Fire Ins. Co. v. Brooks, " the Maryland court
dealt with a five-day notice which was received only one day before it was to
be effective. The court held the notice "nugatory and void,"'" refusing to give
it any effect. The insurer was held liable for a later loss under the policy. In
9 Silvernail v. American Fire and Gas. Co., 80 So.2d 707 (Fla. 1955). See generally,

interpreting N. Y. GENERAL CONSTRUCTION LAW § 20, Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Kevie,
17 App. Div.2d 109, 232 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1962), aff'd, 13 N.Y.2d 971, 194 N.E.2d 686 (1963)
(the first day is not to be included). 6 COUCH, op. cit. supra note 6, § 1437.

10 General Union Fire Is. Co. v. Fred G. Clarke Co., 116 Md. 622, 82 Atl. 974 (1911).
See generally 3 APPLEMAN, op. cit. supra note 4, § 1815.
11 Seaboard Mut. Gas. Co. v. Profit, 108 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1940).
12
13
14

Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Wood, 209 Ala. 380, 96 So. 250 (1923).
Black v. Travelers Ins. Co., 231 Ala. 415, 416, 165 So. 221, 222 (1936).
Warren v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 161 Iowa 440, 442, 143 N.W. 554, 555 (1913).

See generally 6 COUCH, op. cit. supra note 6, § 1437, at 5087.

15 Hanna v. Reliance Ins. Co., 402 Pa. 205, 166 A.2d 877 (1961).
16 Hamilton Ridge Lumber Corp. v. Boston Ins. Co., 133 S.C. 472, 131 S.E. 22 (1925).
17 Langdon v. Maryland Cas. Co., 357 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
18 83 Md. 22, 34 Adt. 373 (1896).

19 Id. at 35, 34 Ad. at 376 (1896).
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German Union Life Ins. Co. v. Fred G. Clarke Co.,2" the Maryland court was
again faced with a five-day notice provision. Here there were only three days
from receipt to date of cancellation. Relying on the condition precedent reasoning that exact compliance was necessary, the court held: "There must be a
present purpose carried out, not a mere intent of future action."'"
In Langdon, the District of Columbia Circuit impliedly"2 accepted the
minority interpretation that a notice stating a period of time shorter than that
required is invalid and does not effect cancellation at any time. A curious
feature of the Langdon policy, and one only occasionally found elsewhere, was
the phrase: "stating when not less than ten days thereafter such cancelation
shall be effective." 2 (Emphasis added.) This is where the difficulty began.
The court said:
Adoption of appellee's interpretation of clause 17 would mean that the
company could send a notice of cancellation without cause before the
expiration of the 60 day period, but not to take effect for another 20, or
30, or even 50 days. This would substantially lessen the protection accorded
the insured by clause 17- that after passage of 60 days he no longer
need fear unexplained or arbitrary termination of his policy.2 4
The reason for the phrase "not less than" is unclear. Its only apparent effect is
to allow the insurance company to collect a premium for an additional period
of time. However, it is usually the company's desire to terminate coverage as
quickly as possible, and a simple ten-day limit between notice and effective
cancellation would serve this purpose. Were it not for this ambiguity, Langdon
might well have been decided differently. In keeping with insurer's desires for
fair interpretations of policy language, it is submitted that this phrase should
be stricken from future policies. Faced with this questionable phrase, the court
had firm ground on which to base its decision in favor of the insured.
A case relied upon by the dissent casts doubt on the proposition that the
law of Maryland holds a notice to be of no effect merely because it contains
an insufficient number of days. The Fourth Circuit, in Seaboard Mut. Cas.
Co. v. Profit,5 applying the law of Maryland, contended that Maryland followed
the majority position. The court held a notice effective, contending it complied
with the contract despite the fact that it was never actually received by the
insured and that it contained an insufficient number of days for notice as required
by the policy. The court decided that the earlier Maryland cases were not
exceptions to the general rule, holding that "a notice of immediate cancellation
defective in point of time becomes operative upon the expiration of the period
20 116 Md. 622, 82 Ati. 974 (1911).
21 Id. at 626, 82 Atl. at 975 (1911).
22 The court, in a footnote, said it refrained from passing on this question, 357 F.2d at 821
(D.C. Cir. 1966). However, the court said that it accepted Maryland law as being the
same as that of the District of Columbia, disregarding the dissent's suggestion that the All
States decision be followed, and viewed exact compliance with the ten-day provision essential,
refusing to give it effect at the end of the period as do cases following the majority position,
357 F.2d at 820 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 108 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1940).
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prescribed in the policy."2 It distinguished the earlier Maryland cases as involving only an "intent to cancel."2" Such reasoning seems clearly incorrect.
Both the earlier Maryland cases and Seaboard were of the same type with a
notice that gave an incorrect number of days. Yet, the federal court was unwilling to follow the Maryland cases and it gave effect to the notice contending
it followed the "current of authority." 8
One of the Langdon court's own cases is on point. Although not an
insurance contract, and thus free of the toning influence of insurance reasoning,
it spoke to a notice provision in a contract:
The contract set the period that the notice must run. The Service
Station agreed by contract that ten days sufficiently protected its position.
It was notified in clear terms that the Standard Company was terminating
the contract. . . . By giving the letter this effect, the Service Station
received fully the protection to which it agreed, the period of notice is
determined by the appropriate contract provision, and the Standard
Company's definite, meaningful act is not an empty gesture. To hold
that the letter had no effect because it mistakenly set a period short of
that required would make a modem application of the brittle fifteenth
century common law. The rule which we adopt, that a notice, good in
all other respects, such as being definite rather than a mere statement of
future intention, is not made totally ineffective because it states a period
shorter than the contract requires, is in accordance with the authorities. 29
While the dissent thought such reasoning applicable and decisive in Langdon,
the majority did not follow it.
This discussion of the minority position, rejected by the Langdon dissent,
illustrates the second element necessary to an understanding of the Langdon
decision. Its basic premise is a strict interpretation of the contract. Its result
is to hold, as did Langdon, a notice ineffective that does not comply exactly
with the policy.
A third concept is needed to complete an understanding of ten-day cancellation provisions. This is the majority doctrine,"0 as illustrated by Seaboard
Mut. Gas. Co. v. Profit,"' that receipt of the notice, when expressly made unnecessary by the policy, is not needed for effective cancellation. 2 The obvious
reason that mere mailing of notice is declared sufficient by the policy is to protect the insurance company from a claim of ineffectiveness because of non26 Id. at 600.

27 The court said: "[T]he rule was applied in both cases to a notice of cancellation
which was construed to be not a notice that a policy had been cancelled, but a notice of
an intent to cancel in the future. . . . [Maryland cases] merely hold that all prospective
notices are nugatory." Seaboard Mut. Cas. Co. v. Profit, 108 F.2d 597, 599-600 (4th Cir.

1940).
28 Id. at 600.

29 All States Serv. Station v. Standard Oil Co., 120 F.2d 714, 715 (D. C. Cir. 1941).
30 E.g., Superior Ins. 'Co. v. Restituto, 124 F. Supp. 392 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Westmoreland v. General Acc. and Life Assur. Co., 144 Conn. 265, 129 A.2d 623 (1957); Grimes
v. State Auto Mut. Ins. Co., 95 Ohio App. 254, 118 N.E.2d 841 (1953).
31 108 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1940). See notes 13 and 24 and accompanying text supra.
32 Curiously, the court in Seaboard reasoned that if notice with an incorrect date was
sufficient to deprive one of protection, one not received should likewise operate:
It is manifest that a notice, which fully complies with the time interval in the
policy, if mailed but not received, furnishes no greater actual notice to the insured
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receipt. The majority of courts will give effect to a notice containing an insufficient number of days on the premise that these days are merely to enable one
to obtain other insurance and the company's obligation under the policy ends
when they have run. But the majority are further willing to give effect to this
notice even if it is not received.
The problem presented by these majority rules in working on the same
subject is: how is one to buy other insurance if he has never received actual
notice of termination? Highly critical of the majority position that allows a
notice mailed but unreceived to be sufficient because of the terms of the policy
is Koehn v. Central Nat'l Life Ins. Co.53 In Koehn, the Kansas Supreme Court
stated:
The rationale

. . .

is that the express terms of the contract uphold the

sufficiency of a notice deposited in the mail, and that such provision,
being unambiguous, must be enforced by the courts as written .... [T]he
in effect constitute the government. .
parties, by their contract,
34
is, of course, a fiction.

.

. This

The Koehn court construed a standard clause identical to the one in Langdon
and said: "[I]f the 'standard cancellation clause' were interpreted as propounded by the insurance company [to make mailing without receipt sufficient],
it would be a violation of the public policy of the state."3 5 Despite this persuasive reasoning, the majority still adhere to the rule, holding a non-received
notice sufficient when it is allowed by the standardized, non-negotiated contract.
At this point, it is proper to examine the underlying reason Mr. Langdon
demanded that his present policy remain in force. At first glance, it would
appear he is insisting on a narrow interpretation as a matter of principle since
no accident occurred for which the insurance company is attempting to disclaim
liability. In reality, he is being placed under a substantial disability. Mr. Langdon rightly contends that being placed in the Assigned Risk Plan, where coverage is available only for the legal minimums, will deny him the coverage necessary in this modem world of large jury verdicts.36 Were the problems to occur
in New York, or another state where compulsory insurance laws are in effect,
his failure to secure other insurance within ten days would force his surrender
of the automobile license and a new registration certificate could not be issued
for thirty days. Were he to operate the automobile within this period, he would
be subject to criminal penalties."
than a notice defective in point of time, and it is equally clear that a defective
notice, if received and construed to take effect only after the lapse of the full time,
gives precisely the same protection as a notice which is correct in its contents. 108
F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1940).
I.e., you lose if you receive notice and you lose if you don't.
33 354 P.2d 352 (Kan. 1960).
34 Id. at 356.
35 Id. at 359.
36 Brief for Appellant, pp. 15, 16, Langdon v. Maryland Cas. Co., 357 F.2d 819
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
37 New York law, N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW §§ 310-321, and decisions also
strongly emphasize the fact that the ten-day provision

(recently extended to twenty)

is

designed to enable one to obtain other insurance, thus, at least in part prescinding from
a strict contract approach and looking to the public policy arguments. E.g., Teeter v.
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The precise question presented in Langdon was: Does cancellation occur
when notice is given, or when it takes effect? Explaining cancellation of insurance policies, the Illinois Court of Appeals has stated:
The courts of this State have construed insurance policies as "cancelled"
and the act of the insurance company to be a "cancellation," when the
insurance company sends a written notice, in which it positively and
affirmatively indicates to the insured that it is the intention of the company that the policy shall cease to be binding as such upon the expiration
of a stipulated number3 8 of days from the time when this intention is made
known to the insured.
Langdon's contention was that "cancel," as used in the policy, refers not to
the date of the giving of notice, but the day notice becomes effective. A Kentucky case reached the opposite result. In Continental Ins. Co. v. Daniel,9
the issue was whether a necessary condition of cancellation, return of the premium, had occurred. The jury found that the company had not returned the
premium and the Kentucky Court of Appeals held against the insurer. It approved the contention that
the act of cancellation should take place and notice and tender be given
and made, and five days after this the cancellation takes effect, and the
policy is then no longer in force ....
[This] seems to imply that the act
of cancellation precedes the notice, but the cancellation is not to take effect
until five days after the giving of the notice of the cancellation. 4
Applied to Langdon, this would mean that the act of cancellation took place
within the allotted time and was sufficient. Only the effect of cancellation
occurred beyond the required period.
However, a case even more directly on point reaches the same result as
did the Langdon court. In Young v. Union Life Ins. Co.,4 a life insurance
policy provided that the policy would be incontestable after one year except
for non-payment of premiums. The company discovered that fraudulent answers
had been given in the application, and delivered notice before the end of the
year, advising of cancellation. It did not tender back the first year's premium.
The company had the privilege of cancelling anytime within the first year on
returning the pro-rata premiums. There was a grace period of one month and
the insured died before the grace period expired. The Illinois Court of Appeals
held the attempted cancellation ineffective, saying:
We are of the opinion that the trial judge was right . . . inasmuch as it
was a notice to terminate the policy at a future time ... a time when, under
Allstate Ins. Co., 9 App Div.2d 176, 192 N.Y.S.2d 610 (1959), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 655, 173
N.E.2d 47, 212 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1961). This case held that the common law right of recission
ab initio did not survive adoption of the compulsory insurance law. 'For a discussion of the
Assigned Risk plan in New York, see Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. O'Connor, 8 App. Div.2d
530, 190 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1959), aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 359, 170 N.E.2d 681, 207 N.Y.S. 2d 679

(1960).

38 Klim v. Johnson, 148 N.E.2d 828, 831 (Ill. App. 1958).
39 78 S.W. 866 (Ky. Ct. App. 1904).
40 78 S.W. 866, 868 (Ky. Ct. App. 1904).
41 202 Ill. App. 321 (1916).
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the incontestable clause, the policy would be incapable of termination by
the defendant.42
The reason for the insurance company's action was clear. As the court said:
"It cannot at one and the same time consider the policy alive for the purpose
of earning premium, and dead for the purpose of avoiding a loss."" The case
establishes, as does Langdon, that a notice given within the incontestable period,
but effective beyond the period, does not satisfy the terms of the policy.
The Langdon question is one of insurance contract ambiguity. If liability
policies are not to contain express provisions governing whether cancellation
for the purpose of the incontestability clause is the date of notice or the date
of effect, a resolution must be sought in competing practical considerations.
It seems beyond question that the ten-day provision was intended as a protective measure so that an insured would not face a period without coverage.
This purpose was satisfied in Langdon as an opportunity to purchase other
insurance did exist for ten days. The second concept, that insurance policies
are to be construed strictly against the insurer, is a solid and well established
rule of construction. Standing alone, it is strong enough to compel the Langdon
result. The third concept is conclusive against the insurer. The majority position, that a contract provision allowing mailing of notice to be sufficient despite
non-receipt, places a heavy burden on the insured. This provision effectively
destroys any advantage the insured person could hope to have by a ten-day
notice provision. As the Koehn case points out," such a provision is so heavy
a penalty that it may well be invalid as against public policy. Under the influence of these considerations, an insurer should not be allowed to claim the
benefit of ambiguous interpretation where he has prepared the insurance contract. The Langdon court correctly finds the balance weighted in favor of the
insured.
Gerard K. Sandweg
LABOR LAW - FINING MEMBER FOR REFuSING TO PARTICIPATE IN A
STRIKE ACTION Is A UNION UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE. - In February of 1959,
UAW Local 248 struck the Allis-Chalmers Corporation at West Allis, Wisconsin.
During the strike, which had been ratified in accordance with the union constitution, 175 out of 7400 employees crossed the union picket lines and continued
to work. The union warned those employees of possible union disciplinary action
for their failure to abide by union rules. When the strike terminated, the union
fined each employee who returned to work during the strike up to one hundred
dollars. In February of 1962, Local 248 again struck the West Allis works of
Allis-Chalmers. Thirty employees out of 5500 in the bargaining unit refused
to participate in this strike. At the same time, UAW Local 401 struck AllisChalmers at its LaCrosse works. There, four out of 625 employees continued
to work. Those employees who refused to engage in the strike action were fined
by the locals.

42 Id. at 328.
43 Id. at 330.
44

See notes 33-35 and accompanying text supra.
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In none of these cases did the union attempt to collect the fines by threatening employment status. However, Allis-Chalmers contended that the mere
imposition of a fine on these member employees constituted a violation of §
8(b) (1) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act.' It charged that this disciplinary action
restrained and coerced the employees in their right to refrain from concerted
activities guaranteed by § 7 of the act.' The National Labor Relations Board
dismissed the employer's complaint.' The United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit unanimously affined the decision of the Board. However,
upon rehearing en banc, a majority of the court (Chief Judge Hastings and
Judges Kiley and Swygert dissenting) withdrew the prior opinion and held: a
labor union is guilty of an unfair labor practice under § 8(b) (1) (A) of the
Taft-Hartley Act when it fines a member for refusing to participate in an
authorized strike action. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB (7th Cir. 1966).
Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act provides:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents- (1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title: Provided, That this paragraph
shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules
with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein .... 4

The language of § 7 dearly provides that employees have a right to refrain from
concerted activity.5 The question the court addressed itself to in Allis-Chalmers
was not whether an employee has a right to refuse to strike, which is clearly
guaranteed by § 7, but whether imposition of a fine for refusing to strike
restrains and coerces a union member in his exercise of rights guaranteed under

§ 7. Resolution of this question is fraught with conflicting considerations. Historically, a policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of voluntary asso7
ciations such as churches, lodges, and labor unions was strictly followed.
However, modem evolution of the labor union as a "quasi-public institution"
distinguished it from other voluntary associations. Abuses of power by labor
organizations created a public reaction resulting in legislation affecting their
internal affairs.' There are limits, however, to the degree of regulation which
will be allowed in the name of public interest. The problem is essentially one of
1
2
3
4
5

61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1964).
61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 149 N.L.R.B. No. 10 (1964).
61 Stat. 141 (1947) 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1964).
61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964). Section 7 states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations .

.

. and to engage in other concerted activities .

.

. and shall also

have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a) (3).
6 NLRB v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1953); Bell Aircraft Corp., 105
N.L.R.B. 755 (1953).
7 E.g., Mayer v. Journeymen Stone-Cutters' Ass'n, 47 N.J. Eq. 519, 20 Atl. 492 (1890);
Thomas v. Musical Mut. Protective Union, 121 N.Y. 45, 24 N.E. 24 (1890). See generally

Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARv. L. Rxv. 1049, 1051 (1951).

8 See generally Aaron & Komaroff, Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs, 44
ILL. L. Rnv. 425, 426 (1949).
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balancing the conflicting interests of employee freedom and union power.9
Professor Summers maintains that unions must have power to discipline members by expulsion and fine if they are to face management as a united and
effective force." But it is equally important that members be protected from
the coercive and arbitrary use of this power by the unions.1 It is to this situation
that Congress responded in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.1
The majority of the court in Allis-Chalmers found no necessity to examine
the legislative history of the act, stating "the statutes in question present no
ambiguities whatsoever. .. ."" The main thrust of the majority opinion was
an affirmation of the plain meaning of the language of § 8 (b) (1) (A) .14 It is
submitted, however, that the language of a statute purporting to guarantee
employee freedom to engage in or refuse to engage in concerted activity while
at the same time preserving union authority to discipline members cannot be
summarily dismissed as unambiguous. On the contrary, as Judge Swygert stated
in his dissenting opinion, "words generally have different shades of meaning,
and the dominant meaning-the one the legislative body intended- can
often be ascertained only by considering the process out of which it evolved.""
To determine what forms of union conduct Congress intended to declare
unlawful under § 8(b) (1) (A), it is necessary to ascertain what is meant by
the terms "restrain or coerce" when applied to union conduct."6 Though by
no means conclusive, the legislative history of the act sheds some light on this
question. The NLRB's view is that "the legislative history strongly suggests that
Congress was interested in eliminating physical violence and intimidation by
the unions or their representatives, as well as the use by unions of threats of
economic action against individuals in an effort to compel them to join." 7
This view is buttressed by the statement of an ardent supporter of the TaftHartley Act, Senator Ball: "we are not trying to interfere with the internal
affairs of a union which is already organized. All we are trying to cover is the
9 "The Taft-Hartley Act was, to a marked degree, the result of conflict and compromise
between strong contending forces and deeply held views on the role of organized labor in
the free economic life of the Nation and the appropriate balance to be struck. . . ." United
Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 99-100 (1958). See NLRB v. Drivers Local
639 (Curtis Bros.), 362 U.S. 274, 280 (1960); NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S.
87, 96 (1957). See generally 1 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS AcT, 1947, 295 (1948) [hereinafter referred to as LEGIS. HIST.].
10 Summers, supra note 7, at 1049.
11 See generally Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unlions Under the Labor Reform Act of
1959, 58 MicH. L. REV. 819, 834-35 (1960); Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327 (1958).
12 Twelve years later, Congress was still trying to complete this task in the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 401
(1964).
13 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B. (7th Cir. 1966).
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 This question is not a new one. In a case coming before the NLRB soon after the
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board said, "The Act contains no affirmative definition
of the terms 'restraint' and 'coercion' as they are used in Section 8(b)(1)...." Sunset Line
& Twine Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 1487, 1504 (1948).
17 National Maritime Union of America, 78 N.L.R.B. 971, 985 (1948), aff'd, 175 F.2d
686 (2d Cir. 1949); rev'd in part, Alloy Mfg. Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 307 (1957). See Curtis
Bros., 362 U.S. 274, 287, 290 (1960). But cf. PETRO, HOW THE NLRB REPEALED TAFTHARTLEY 51 (1958).
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coercive and restraining acts of the union in its effort to organize unorganized
employees."'"
Congress never specifically addressed itself to the problem of a union fining
members who refuse to strike. In the congressional debates, when proponents
of the act indicated what type of conduct would be circumscribed, they referred
to forms of economic coercion which amounted to threats to a worker's job
security. 9 Thus, the legislative history indicates that imposing fines for violating an internal union rule requiring members to participate in strike actions
was not intended to be classified as an unfair practice under § 8 (b) (1) (A).
Before turning to the judicial interpretations of § 8(b) (1) (A), an important distinction must be made. While § 7 preserves an area of free action for
the employee, it is clear that his freedom to engage in or refrain from concerted
action will often be limited because of his status as a union member. It is
important to recognize the distinction between a worker's rights and duties as
an employee and his rights and duties as a member of a labor organizationthe two are entirely distinct. By working for an employer, the employee enters
into a relationship with certain attendant rights and duties. An entirely different
relationship arises when an employee freely chooses to join a union. He then
assumes the responsibilities of a member of that organization, subjecting himself
to its rules and regulations.2
In yielding his power to bargain directly with the employer as a consequence
of joining the union, the member voluntarily restricts his § 7 freedom. The
union representative, acting for the members in arriving at a compromise in
a collective bargaining negotiation, exercises a degree of choice and discretion
which is denied to the individual member.2 ' While members will ultimately
be called upon to ratify the action of their representative, an individual member
gives up his freedom to bargain directly with the employer. Once the majority
votes for union representation, individual contracts with the employer will not
be allowed to surmount or defeat collective agreements?2 Often, an employee's
right to strike, guaranteed by § 7, will be waived in a collective bargaining
agreement even though the employee did not vote for the agreement.2"
18

2 LEGis. HIST. 1200. For other statements of Senator Ball concerning the scope of

the Act, see 2 LEGIs. HIST. 1018-20; 2 LEoxs. HIsT. 1141.

For relevant statements by

Senator Taft, see 2 LEGIS. HIsT. 1205-06.
19 See Curtis Bros., 362 U.S. 274, 286 (1960). The Supreme Court has been cautious,
absent clear statutory language, in interpreting labor legislation so as to curtail the rights of
unions. But "Congress has been rather specific when it has come to outlaw particular
economic weapons on the part of unions." NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477,
498 (1960).
20 In NLRB v. United Auto. Workers, 320 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1963), the court accepted
this distinction when it said, "At this point [when he becomes a member] . . . the employee
takes off the protective mantle of Section 7's 'refrain' provision and renders himself amenable to the reasonable internal regulations of the organization with which he chooses to cast
his lot. . . ." Id. at 15. See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954). In
his dissent in Allis-Chalmers, Chief Judge Hastings reasoned,
It does not necessarily follow that an employee who Vs a union member may claim
the same right of self-organization for collective bargaining purposes and at the
same time claim the right to belong to the labor organization on his own terms.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB (7th Cir. 1966).
21 'Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
22 J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
23 Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1955). See Humphrey v. Moore,

375 U.S. 335 (1964).
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Section 8(b) (1) (A) protects the union's right to prescribe its own rules
with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership. It has been seen
that a worker who joins a union assumes new obligations and duties. Underlying this is the assumption that there is an area of action reserved to the unions
in which they may properly discipline members who fail to fulfill their membership obligations.2" In Minneapolis Star & Tribune,2 5 the union fined a
member five hundred dollars for failing to picket. The Board held that this
fine was a form of coercion, but not the type of coercion Congress intended to
prohibit. The Board stated that imposition of a fine for a member's refusal to
abide by union rules is not, in itself, proscribed activity. In NLRB v. Amalgamated Local 286, UAW, 8 no violation of § 8(b) (1) (A) was found where
union members were threatened with loss of insurance coverage for failure to
pay a union-imposed fine growing out of their refusal to make a mandatory
contribution to the union building fund. The court reasoned that insurance
coverage was a benefit attendant to the employee's membership and that withdrawal of such benefits by the union was wholly within its "right to regulate
5
its internal affairs." 27 In Wisconsin Motors,"
the union fined members for
exceeding a production quota ceiling. The Board upheld the fine as a proper
exercise of union power on the grounds that the employees, by joining the union,
elected to subject themselves to its rules and regulations. The Board stated,
"[I]nternal union disciplines were not among the restraints intended to be encompassed by the section." 29
However, the union's power to direct its own internal affairs is not unlimited. In Charles Skura,'0 the Board held that fining a union member who
filed a charge against the union with the NLRB before exhausting all internal
remedies violated § 8(b) (1) (A). In that case, the union argued that requiring
a member to exhaust all internal remedies open to him was a legitimate exercise
of the union's right to regulate its internal affairs. The Board rejected this
argument, holding that the overriding public interest in seeing that every union
member has ready access to the NLRB made the union's conduct unfair.2
24 "The proviso of Section 8(b) (1) (A) of that act . .. is a clear indication that Congress
did not intend the Board's policing of union unfair labor practices to encompass general supervision of intra-union administration." NLRB v. Local 3, Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union,
216 F.2d 285, 288 (2d Cir. 1954). See e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales,
356 U.S. 617 (1958); Parks v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 314 F.2d 886 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963); American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB,
193 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1951), aff'd, 345 U.S. 100 (1953). See also Sugerman, The Rights
of the Individual Employee Under the Taft-Hartley Act, N.Y.U. 3RD CONFERENCE ON LABOR
LAW 357-58 (1950).
25 109 N.L.R.B. 727 (1954).
26 222 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1955).
27 Id. at 98.
28 Wisconsin Motors Corp., 145 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964), sub nom., UAW Local 283 v.
Scofield, 382 U.S. 205 (1965). (Court limited its consideration to questions of jurisdiction
and denied the union leave to intervene). Contra, Associated Home Builders of Greater
East Bay v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1965). The question of production ceiling
quotas is treated in 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 558 (1964).
29 Id. at 1100.
30 Operating Eng'rs, Local 138 (Charles Skura), 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964). See generally note, 40 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 86, 96 (1964).
31 Id. at 683. In H. B. Roberts, 148 N.L.R.B. 674 (1964), the Board relied on the
Skura principle in finding an unfair labor practice where the union fined a member for
filing a charge against the union before exhausting all internal union remedies. Cf. NLRB'v.
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In Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 2 the union had an employee removed from
his job for failure to tender his delinquent dues and to pay a fine imposed for
this delinquency under a union security agreement. The NLRB held that
"assessments and fines imposed for various reasons are not 'periodic dues' within
the meaning of the Act and that their imposition restrains and coerces employees
in violation of § 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act.""3 The crux of the unfair labor
practice in the Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. case was that the member's employment was conditioned upon payment of the fine. The Board had no quarrel
with imposition of the fine, since this grew out of a strictly internal affair.
However, as soon as the union entered the sphere of the employer-employee
relationship by attempting to affect the member's job status, it committed an
unfair labor practice. In Union Starch & Refining Co. v. NLRB, 4 the court
declared that failure to conform to a union regulation may not result in the
employee's discharge from employment except where he has failed to pay periodic
dues or initiation fees under § 8(b) (2) of the act. 5 Where an employee was
fined five hundred dollars for dual unionism, the court held that the union's
efforts to have him discharged from his job for refusing to pay the fine restrained and coerced the employee in the exercise of his right to refrain from
concerted activity.3 6 The same result obtained when the union sought an
employee's discharge for failure to pay a fine resulting from his non-attendance
at union meetings32 and where the fine resulted from the employee's refusal to
picket. 8
These cases indicate that while imposition of a fine is not "economic
coercion" per se, the moment the union seeks to affect its members' employment status to coerce payment, it violates § 8(b) (1) (A)." A recent Board
decision states this principle clearly. In Tawas Tube Prods.,4" the local union
expelled a member for filing and supporting a decertification petition against
the international union. In finding no violation of § 8(b) (1) (A), the Board
emphasized two points: there was no attempt by the union to affect the

Die & Tool Makers Lodge 113, 231 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1956); Virginia-Carolina Freight
Lines, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. No. 52 (1965).
32 110 N.L.R.B. 918 (1954).
33 Id. at 922.
34 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951).
35 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1964).
36 NLRB v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 203 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1953).
37 Electric Auto-Lite Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 1073 (1950), enforced, 196 F.2d 500 (6th Cir.
1952); Packinghouse Workers Union, 142 N.L.R.B. 768 (1963).
38 Eclipse Lumber Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 464 (1951), enforced, 199 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1952).
Cf. NLRB v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1953).
39 In NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963), the court rejected the
theory that a union action which merely adversely affects the terms or conditions of employment of a member is an unfair labor practice. In this case, the union sought to have an
employee's seniority reduced for a minor violation of a collective bargaining agreement, though
his action was authorized by the company. The court said, "discrimination for reasons wholly
unrelated to 'union membership, loyalty, the acknowledgment of union authority, or the
performance of union obligations,' is not sufficient to support findings . . ." of an unfair
labor practice. Id. at 175. For a further discussion of Miranda, see 39 NOTRE DAmE LAWYER
617 (1964). See generally Figueroa v. National Maritime Union 342 F.2d 400 (2d Cir.
1965).
40 151 N.L.R.B. No. 9 (1965).
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employee's job status; and the basis of the expulsion was within a legitimate
area of union discipline.41
One case disagrees with this analysis. The issue presented in Allen Bradley
Co. v. NLRB " was whether the company could legitimately insist on bargaining with the union over the question of restricting the union's power to discipline members who refuse to strike. The court stated:
Section 7 protects an employee in his right to refrain from concerted activities and this includes, of course, the right to refuse to participate in or
recognize a strike. Coercion or interference with that right, whether by
the employer or 4by
the union, is made an unfair labor practice by the
3
terms of the Act.
In very plain language, the Allen Bradley court made it clear that it considered
imposition of a fine against a member who refuses to strike an activity unrelated
to the acquisition or retention of membership and, as such, an unprotected
union activity under § 8 (b) (1) (A) ." It is significant, however, that in citing
the authoritative basis for its opinion, the majority in Allis-Chalmers could find
only this one case squarely in its corner. Nevertheless, the Allen-Bradley decision
was viewed as dispositive of the issue.4" The dissent, however, rejected the
language relied on by the majority as mere "gratuitous statements" which were
not controlling.46 The authority of Allen-Bradley is indeed open to attack
because the issue in that case concerned contract negotiation. The court's remarks
relating to the union's right to fine a member for refusing to strike were only
collateral to the question which the court was required to decide. And, as in
Allis-Chalmers, the court cited no authority to substantiate its remarks.
The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act strongly indicates that the
type of pressure used by the union in Allis-Chalmers was not "coercive" as
defined by § 8(b) (1) (A). In addition, courts have been cautious in intruding
upon the union's right to regulate its internal affairs. Underlying this is the
distinction between a worker's rights and duties relative to his employer and
the separate rights and duties which a worker assumes when he becomes a union
member. It is here that a special relationship arises between the worker and
the union, subjecting the worker to the union's right to control its internal
affairs. As long as the union does not intrude into the sphere of the employeeemployer relationship by seeking to affect the member's job status, the union
may discipline the member for a breach of his duty to the union.
In Allis-Chalmers, the union made no attempt to affect the members'
41 Ibid. The Board distinguished this case from Skura, 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964), finding
no overriding policy interest in permitting a member to question his union's certification.
On the contrary, it took the position that the union's very existence was being threatened by
the member's conduct. Thus, strong action by the union would be justified. Whether or not
the Board validly distinguished this case from Skura, it still accurately illustrates a test used
to ascertain the presence of restraint or coercion. See generally Cox, supra note 11, at 835.
42 286 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1961), reversing 127 N.L.R.B. 44 (1960).
43 Id. at 445.
44 "It [the union] goes beyond any permissible limit when it imposes a sanction upon a
member because of his exercise of a right guaranteed by the Act." Id. at 446.
45 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B. (7th Cir. 1966).
46 Ibid.
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employment status. The members were fined for refusing to participate in a
union activity which was required of all members by union rules. This is not a
restraint of the members' exercise of their § 7 rights to refrain from concerted
activity, because upon joining the union they elected to be subjected to reasonable internal rules. Undeniably, by allowing unions to fine members under their
right to regulate internal affairs, we are, in fact, reducing the freedom which
members may effectively exercise. In most instances, a fine or the threat of a
fine will be sufficient to dissuade a union member from effectively exercising
his rights preserved by § 7. But Congress has opted for a national labor policy
which allows labor organizations to protect their bargaining power from fragmentation. Under this existing labor policy, unions should have the right to
fine members who refuse to participate in a strike action.
John Thomas Harty
ANTITRUST LIMITATION OF ACTIONS PENDENCY OF GOVERNMENT
CASE SUSPENDS RUNNING OF LIMITATIONS IN PRIVATE ACTION WHEN
ALLEGATIONS OF BOTH CASES ARE SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME UNDER SECTION 5 (B), CLAYTON ACT. - On September 28, 1956, plaintiffs, a partnership

engaged in wholesale distribution of refined petroleum products and one of its
partners,' brought an action for treble damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act2
in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of California. They
alleged injury to their business proximately resulting from a combination or
conspiracy among defendants -seven
companies engaged in producing, refining and marketing gasoline and other hydrocarbon substances in interstate
commerce- to exclude and prevent plaintiffs from engaging in the wholesale distribution of gasoline in Southern California in violation of §§ 1' and 2"
of the Sherman Act. Defendants asserted, by way of an affirmative defense,
that plaintiffs' action was barred by the California one-year statute of limitations applicable to suits for statutory penalties or forfeitures.' Plaintiffs conceded
1 A separate trial on the question of whether one of two partners of a dissolved
partnership may bring a suit in the partnership name without joining the other party as
a: party plaintiff held: it was allowed since the prosecution of a treble-damage suit for
claimed injury to the partnership business allegedly caused by violation of the federal antitrust laws is an act appropriate for winding up partnership affairs within the California
code. Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 165 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Cal. 1958), noted in 73
HAiv. L. Rv. 411 (1959).
2 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
3 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
4 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
5 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 340(1) (West Supp. 1965). Before a uniform four year
federal statute of limitations was added to the Clayton Act in 1955, state limitation provisions were used. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906);
Hoskins Coal & Dock Corp., v. Truax Traer Coal Co., 191 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 947 (1952). These statutes varied from one to ten years in length.
Thus, success of plaintiff's suit rested on the fortuity of location and local interpretation of
statutes which were never meant to govern federal antitrust litigation. Note, Antitrust
Enforcement By Private Parties: Analysis of Developments In the Treble Damage Suit, 61

YALE L.J. 1010, 1030 (1952). Once it was determined that the state limitation provision
governed, it became a question of whether the action was characterized as a penalty, with
a short limitation period, or an action on a statutory liability other than a penalty, with a
longer period. The weight of authority considers the action compensatory. E.g., Bertha
Bldg. Corp. v. National Theatres Corp., 269 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361
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that their cause of action accrued no later than February 1954, and that the
four-year limitation provision added to the Clayton Act in 1955,6 was not
applicable to a right of action accruing in 1954. But plaintiffs contended that
the governing provision was the California three-year statute of limitations
respecting actions on a statutory liability other than a penalty,' and that in any
event the running of the statute of limitations was suspended by § 5 (b) of the
Clayton Act,8 due to a civil antitrust proceeding commenced by the United
States in 1950 which was still pending when plaintiffs filed their complaint.9
The district court upheld the defense of limitations and dismissed the complaint, holding that the one-year statute governed."0 In addition, the court held
the plaintiffs were not entitled to the benefit of § 5(b) because the period of
the alleged conspiracy in their case differed from the period of the alleged
conspiracy in the Government proceeding, and the defendants in both cases
were not the same; therefore, this action was not "based in whole or in part
on any matter complained of in said proceeding."" The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed." The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari limited to the question of the applicability of § 5 (b)." The
Court, in reversing, held: a comparison of the complaints in the Government's
civil antitrust case and in the instant case disclosed that this case was based
in part on matters of which the Government complained, so that the pendency of the Government case suspended the running of the period of limitations in the case at bar, notwithstanding the fact that there were differences
in the defendants named in the two cases and in the period of conspiracies
alleged. Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54 (1965).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized "the public interest in
vigilant enforcement of the antitrust laws through the instrumentality of the
private treble-damage action."' 4 It has also stated,
U.S. 960 (1960); Skouras Theatres Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 193 F. Supp.
401 (S.D. N.Y. 1961). See Vold, Are Threefold Damages Under The Anti-Trust Act Penal
Or Compensatory? 28 Ky. L.J. 117 (1940). See also Note, Federal Statutes Without Limitations Provisions, 53 COLUm. L. R.v. 68 (1953); Note, Treble Damage Time Limitations:
Federalism Rampant, 60 YALE L.J. 553 (1951).
6 Clayton Act § 4B, 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) '(1964). This section was
enacted June 7, 1955 and took effect January 7, 1956. Treble-damage suits whose cause
of action accrued prior to 1956 are at the present time quite rare.
7 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 338(1) (West Supp. 1965).
8 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964).
Section 5(b) states:
Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States to
prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws, but not including
an action under section 15a of this title, the running of the statute of limitations
in respect of every private right of action arising under said laws and based in
whole or in part on any matter complained of in said proceeding shall be suspended
during the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter: Provided, however, That
whenever the running of the statute of limitations in respect of a cause of action
arising under section 15 of this title is suspended hereunder, any action to enforce
such cause of action shall be forever barred unless commenced either within the
period of suspension or within four years after the cause of action accrued.
9 United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, Civil No. 11584-C (S.D. Cal. 1958)
(consent judgment).
10 Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 208 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
11 Ibid.
12 Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 330 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1964).
13 379 U.S. 877 (1964).
14 Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955).
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Congress has, by legislative fiat, determined that such prohibited activies
are injurious to the public and has provided sanctions allowing private
enforcement of the antitrust laws by an aggrieved party. These laws
protect the victims of the forbidden practices as well as the public.15
Thus, "as between enforcement action by government agencies and by private
parties, there are a number of reasons to believe that action by private parties
is both more desirable and more effective."'" The effectiveness of the role that
private action plays in the enforcement of the antitrust laws was recognized
by Congress in passing § 4 of the Clayton Act which allows "any person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws . . ." to sue for treble damages, the cost of the suit, and a

reasonable attorney's fee.'

This section has spawned

a curious combination of public regulatory and private compensatory
law. While parties sue to enforce federal antitrust policy, recovery hinges
upon a showing that violations cause injury to plaintiffs. Even where a valid
cause of action exists, defenses common to civil litigation may bar suit....'11
Thus, Congress, in enacting §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, had a much broader
goal than merely making provision for alleviation of individual grievances
resulting from violations of the antitrust laws. Rather, it was the legislative
intent that an individual, by securing redress for himself, would thereby supplement governmental enforcement in the antitrust field. 9
Private litigation has increased tremendously since the end of World War
II. No doubt this increase can be explained by the potential financial rewards
of a successful suit."0 However, a disadvantage resulting from this seemingly
advantageous means of private enforcement is the fact that "big money makes
substantial law out of what may have appeared to be small questions ....

The

multiplication of big money by three draws into issue all manner and maneuver
of the private antitrust suit."'"
During the past few years, a direct result of this tendency to overempha15 Radovich v. National Football League 352 U.S. 445, 453-54 (1957).
16 Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar Of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST BULL.
167, 168 (1958); see e.g., Bruice's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947);
United States v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
17 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964), superseding similar provisions in the
Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 210 (1890) and 28 Stat. 570 (1894) which were restricted in operation to the particular act cited. Private suits for injunction are authorized by § 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964). For an excellent discussion of the role of
the private treble-damage suit in antitrust enforcement, see Note, Antitrust Enforcement By
Private Parties: Analysis of Developments In the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010
(1952). Incorporated cities, Chattanooga Foundry Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906),
and states, State of Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942), but not the United States, United
States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941), are "persons" within the meaning of Clayton
Act § 4 and can sue for treble damages.
18 Note, Antitrust Enforcement By Private Parties: Analysis Of Developments In The
Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1011 (1952).
19 MacIntyre, The Role Of The Private Litigant In Antitrust Enforcement, 7 ANTITRUST
BULL. 113 (1962).
20 Plaintiffs' amended complaint in Leh stated damages in the sum of $245,000.00 which
trebled results in a potential recovery of $735,000.00. Appendix to Brief for Respondents,
p. 23.
21 Matteoni, An Antitrust Argument: Whether A Federal Trade Commission Order Is
Within The Ambit Of The Clayton Act's Section 5, 40 NOTRE DAmE LAWYER 158 (1965).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
size small points of law has been extensive litigation over the interpretation of
both paragraphs of § 5 of the Clayton Act.22 "The primary intent of that section is to make the private litigant's weapon more effective" 3 by easing the
burden of maintaining private suits. Section 5(a) allows a final judgment or
decree rendered in a suit by the United States and holding a defendant in
violation of the antitrust laws to be prima facie evidence in a private antitrust
action against such defendant "as to all matters respecting which said judgment
or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto."24 This does not
relieve the private plaintiff of the necessity of preparing his proof nor does it shift
the burden of proof; the judgment is admissible simply as an evidentiary item
that may be rebutted. However, once a judgment is introduced, its influence
on juries may go far beyond the prima facie effect contemplated by the statute.25
One impediment to the use of § 5(a) by the private litigant is that it is
usually unavailable since most Government actions result in nolo contendere
pleas or consent decrees before testimony is taken, and thus do not provide
judgments that qualify under § 5(a) since these types are exempted by the
concluding proviso to the section.26 Congress hoped that by relieving the private
litigant of the necessity of again proving the facts in the government's case, that
the overwhelming handicap in favor of monopoly would be reduced, thereby
22 Section 5(a), 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C.
§ 16(a) (1964), provides:
A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or criminal
proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws
to the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence
against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other party
against such defendant under said laws or by the United States under section 15a
of this title, as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be
an estoppel as between the parties thereto: Provided, That this section shall not
apply to consent judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken or
to judgments or decrees entered in actions under section 15a of this title.
For text of § 5 (b), see note 8 supra.
23 Matteoni, supra note 21, at 158. Section 5 of the Clayton Act was adopted in response
to President Wilson's 1914 plea to Congress to enact a law designed to make it easier for
antitrust victims to collect damages through private lawsuits, since preparing an antitrust
case against a major corporate defendant was a larger task than most injured persons could
undertake. He recommended that Congress "agree in giving private individuals . . . the
right to found their [antitrust] suits for redress upon the facts and judgments proved and
entered in suits by the Government" and also "that the statute of limitations . . . be suffered
to run against such litigants only from the date of the conclusion of the Government's action."
51 CONG. Rnc. 1964 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914). See also Dix, Decrees And Judgments
Under Section 5 Of The Clayton Antitrust Law, 30 GEo. L.J. 331 (1942).
24 In commenting on the purposes to be served by § 5(a), the Supreme Court said: "We
think that Congress intended to confer, subject only to a defendant's enjoyment of its day in
court against a new party, as large an advantage as the estoppel doctrine would afford had
the Government brought suit." Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558,
568 (1951). Prior to passage of the Clayton Act, a judgment from a Government action
was not admissible in a subsequent private suit. Ware-Kramer Tobacco Co. v. American
Tobacco Co., 178 Fed. 117 (C.C.E:D.N.C. 1910).
25 Note, Antitrust Enforcement By Private Parties: Analysis Of Development In The
Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE LJ. 1010, 1040 (1952).
26 Consent decrees are not admissible by the terms of § 5(a). 5 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964).
Courts have treated pleas of nolo contendere as "consent decrees" for § 5(a) purposes. See,
e.g., Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366 (D. Minn. 1939), aff'd, 119 F.2d
747 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941). As to whether a guilty plea is to be
considered a "consent judgment" within the proviso, see Commonwealth Edison Co. v. AllisChalmers Mfg. Co., 323 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964); N.W.
Elec. Power Co-op. v. General Elec. Co., 30 F.R.D. 557 (W.D. Mo. 1961). Contra, City
of Burbank v. General Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1964).

RECENT DECISIONS

achieving a more effective enforcement of the antitrust laws. Subsequent interpretations of § 5 (a) by the courts defeated this congressional policy. The section
was designed to be merely a rule of evidence - the facts proved in the Government case were to be accepted as prima facie for the private suit -but it has
been misapplied as an estoppel statute depriving litigants of the evidentiary benefits it was intended to provide. The unfortunate effect of these interpretations,
limiting § 5 (a) as though it were merely an estoppel statute, has been to almost
totally reduce its usefulness as an implement of antitrust policy2
In contrast to the somewhat limited scope of § 5 (a), § 5 (b) presents a totally
independent and different kind of statutory aid to the private litigant.28 Section
5(b) provides for the suspension of the applicable statute of limitations during
the pendency of a prior Government proceeding and for one year thereafter
in every private cause of action arising under the antitrust laws as long as the
private action is "based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in"
the Government proceeding.2" Whereas § 5(a) is unavailable if a Government
prosecution ends in a consent decree or if a nolo contendere plea is entered"0
and permits the use of Government judgments and decrees as prima facie
evidence only as to matters actually decided in the Government suit, the tolling
provision suspends the statute of limitations during the pendency"' of the Government prosecution as to matters complained of "whether or not they are
actually decided." 2
27 Hardy, The Evisceration of Section 5 of the Clayton Act, 49 GEo. L.J. 44 (1960).
See also Note, Government Judgments as Evidence in Private Anti-Trust Proceedings:Section
5 of the Clayton Act, 46 ILL. L. REv. 765 (1951).
28
The committee reports on the 1955 amendment to Section 5, plainly intimated a
broader reason for tolling the statute of limitations. By 1955, the Supreme Court
had pointed to the limited practical value of the prima facie evidence to a private
suitor. . . . The real importance of government proceedings that accrues today to
private suitors is the availability to them of the government's case against the
defendant. Section 5(b) enables 'a plaintiff to take advantage of facts uncovered'
as a result of the government proceedings.
New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 346, 359 (3d
Cir. 1964), aff'd, 381 U.S. 311 (1965).
29 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964). There are also other grounds upon which the statute of
limitations may be suspended. Thus, the fraudulent concealment of the existence of a cause
of action based upon § 4 of the Clayton Act suspends the four-year statute of limitations
provided in §§ 4B and 5(b) of the Act. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. City of Burlington,
326 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 326
F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1964); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 315
F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1963); Public Serv. Co. of New Mexico v. General Elec. Co., 315 F.2d
306 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963); Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec.
Co., 312 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 909 (1963); Kansas City v.
Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 310 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963).
30 See note 26 supra.
31 For purposes of § 5(b), a Government suit ceases to pend and the statute of limitations
begins to run again "when the violations charged in that suit have been resolved and
accorded finality by Court decision." Tague v. Balaban, 146 F. Supp. 356, 361 (N.D. Ill.
1956). See Grengs v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 232 F.2d 325 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956); Valuskis v. Loew's Inc., 140 F. Supp. 34 (S.D. Cal. 1956);
Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 117 F. Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). A consent
decree has been held not to terminate the "pendency" of a Government suit. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp. v. Brookside Theatre Corp., 194 F.2d 846 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 942 (1952); Christensen v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 446 (D. Utah
1950). Contra, Sun Theatre Corp. v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 213 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1954);
Manny v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 807 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
32 New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 346, 357
(3d Cir. 1964), aff'd, 381 U.S. 311 (1965).
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The initial determination of the applicability of § 5(b) is limited to a
comparison of the two complaints - the Government's and the private litigant's
on their face.3" "Obviously suspension of the running of the statute of limitations pending resolution of the government action may not be made to turn
on whether the United States is successful in proving the allegations of its
complaint." 4 "Otherwise the plaintiff in a private party case would never
know at what stage of a Government case the tolling began. A plaintiff should
not have to guess at his peril the intention underlying the normal meanings of
words.""5 Thus the "test is not the relief ultimately granted, but what the
government complained of, regardless of whether the charges are ever supported
and despite the fact that they may have been completely without any foundation." 6 "Equally, the availability of § 5 (b) to the private claimant may not be
made dependent on his ability to prove his case, however fatal failure may
prove to his hopes of success on the merits."3 "
Until very recently there had been considerable authority for the view
that § 5(b) was available only when § 5(a) was, and that the two sections were
co-extensive.3 8 Thus, § 5 (b) could operate to suspend the statute of limitations
only when the prior Government decree would be potentially admissible as
prima facie evidence under the conditions imposed by § 5 (a) ." The potentially
harmful effect of viewing these two sections as interdependent was expurgated
recently by the United States Supreme Court in Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing" in its decision on whether administrative
(Federal Trade Commission) proceedings toll the statute of limitations under
§ 5 (b) to the same extent as do judicial proceedings.
In Proper v. John Bene & Sons"' it was held that FTC orders could not
serve as prima facie evidence in a subsequent private action. These proceedings
were not considered civil or criminal proceedings brought by or on behalf of
the United States as required by § 5 (a) because the FTC was an investigatory
rather than a judicial body.' When the question of an FTC proceeding as
tolling the statute of limitations was finally advanced in the courts, a majority,"3
33 Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 65 (1965).
34 Ibid.
35 United Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 172 F. Supp. 580, 589 (D. Conn. 1959).
36 Radio Corp. of America v. Rauland Corp., 186 F. Supp. 704, 709-10 (N.D. Iln. 1956).
37 Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 66 (1965).
38 Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1964);
Steiner v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1956); Sun Theatre
Corp. v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 213 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1954); Farmington Dowel
Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 223 F. Supp. 967 '(D. Me. 1963); Volasco Prods. Co. v.
Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 223 F. Supp. 712 (E.D. Tenn. 1963), aff'd, 346 F.2d 661 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 904 (1965); Momand v. Universal Film Exch., Inc., 43 F. Supp.
996 (D. Mass. 1942), aff'd, 172 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 967 (1949).
39
Since judgments there could not serve as prima facie evidence here, those proceed.
ings cannot toll the statute of limitations for the benefit of this plaintiff. This is
clear from the juxtaposition of the two paragraphs which together constitute
Section 5 of the Clayton Act.
Momand v. Universal Film Exch., 43 F. Supp. 996, 1012 (D. Mass. 1942).
40 381 U.S. 311 (1965).
41 295 Fed. 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1923).
42 Ibid.
43 Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1964);
Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 223 F. Supp. 967 (D. Me. 1963); Volasco
Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 223 F. Supp. 712 (E.D. Tenn. 1963), aff'd, 346
F.2d 661 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 904 (1965).
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by extending Proper'sliteral reading of the requirements for admissibility, held
that FTC proceedings could not toll the statute of limitations either. The
Supreme Court, in Minnesota Mining, held that regardless of whether FTC
proceedings were admissible under § 5(a) or not, they did operate to toll the
statute of limitations because they are civil proceedings within § 5(b)." The
court pointed out that differences in the statutory language of the two sections
'
were apparent and suggested that they were not "wholly interdependent."
In addition, when the congressional policies underlying the two sections were
examined, it became "even more apparent that the applicability of § 5 (a) to
Federal Trade Commission actions should not control the question whether
such proceedings toll the statute of limitations."'" The need for this severability
was demonstrated in the words of District Judge Augelli in Minnesota Mining:
It certainly would seem not to have been the Congressional intent to
have plaintiffs rights turn on the fortuitous circumstance of which agency
initiated the action. To permit a plaintiff to take advantage of facts
uncovered as a result of a Department of Justice proceeding, but not as
proceeding brought under the
a result of a Federal Trade Commission
47
same statute, does not seem logical.
The interpretation given to § 5(b) by the Court in Minnesota Mining is
perfectly consistent with the legislature's intent in enacting the section. Whatever ambiguities may be found in the legislative history of the provision as to
other questions, "it is plain that in § 5 (b) Congress meant to assist private litigants in utilizing any benefits they might cull from government antitrust
actions."4"
44 381 U.S. 311 (1964). The Court stated, "Even if we assumed arguendo that § .5(a)
is inapplicable to Commission proceedings-a question upon which we venture no opinion.
• . ." Id. at 318. The Court, in holding that an FTC order is within § 5(b), has made it
easier to find that a controverted agency command is also within § 5(a). See Matteoni 7 supra
note 21. The lower court had held that FTC proceedings fulfilled both parts of § 5. New
Jersey Wood Finishing v. 'Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 346, 357 (3d Cir. 1964).
See Rockefeller, The Supreme Court And The Private Antitrust Plaintiff, 7 B.C. IND & CoAK
L.R. 279 (1966).
45 Id. at 316.
46 Id. at 317.
47 New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 216 F. Supp. 507,
510 (D.N.J. 1963).
48 Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 317
(1965). When Congress amended § 5 in 1955 to establish a uniform federal statute of limitations and to enable the government to bring damage suits, it apparently recognized that the
legal process of the Government proceeding can uncover much which points the way for
the subsequent plaintiff. This is shown by the fact that the amendment suspended the statute
of limitations for an additional year beyond the conclusion of the Government case.
As the Senate Report pointed out:
There are many instances where the statute of limitations as to a private cause
of action may nearly have expired before suit is instituted by the Government
under the antitrust laws. Although the statute is tolled during the pendency of
the proceedings brought by the United States, the plaintiff in a treble-damage
action may find himself hard pressed to reap the benefits of the Government suit
if, upon its conclusion, he has but a short time remaining to study the Government's
case, estimate his own damages, assess the strength and validity of his suit, and
prepare and file his complaint. To alleviate such difficulties, the present bill would
extend the tolling period not only for the duration of the Government's antitrust
suit, but for 1 year thereafter. This would guarantee all plaintiffs an adequate
period in which to take advantage of Government antitrust proceedings. ...
S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1955).
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The favorable reaction to the use of § 5 (b) by private litigants, evidenced
by the Court's liberalizing interpretation in Minnesota Mining, was bound to
evoke further clarifications by the Court on its application. One such construction was given almost immediately in Leh. The question presented for the
Court's determination was a clarification of the phrase, "based in whole or in
part on any matter complained of"49 in the Government proceeding. Although
this phrase seems plain enough, it had received different interpretations as to
the degree of specificity with which a private litigant's complaint must mirror
that of the Government before the statute of limitations is suspended by operation of § 5(b). This split of authority is yet another example of how big money
makes big law.
In Leh, the plaintiffs' complaint differed in two significant respects from
5
the complaint in United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California,
" the Government proceeding relied upon to suspend the statute of limitations by the plaintiffs
in Leh. The Government complaint in Standard Oil charged that eight defendants had conspired to restrain and monopolize interstate commerce in the
Pacific States area in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, beginning in
1936 and continuing until 1950, the date suit was filed. 5' Similarly, plaintiffs'
amended complaint in Leh also charged a conspiracy to violate §§ 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act. But plaintiffs in Leh alleged a conspiracy commencing in
1948 (the year in which they commenced business) and continuing until the
filing of the complaint in 1956. In Leh, there were also different defendants
in the two suits; two of the defendants in the Government proceeding were
not named as defendants in the private suit and one additional defendant was
named in Leh who was not a Government defendant, though dismissed from
the case before this litigation commenced. The issue presented for determination
was whether this variance between the two suits was substantial enough to
deprive the plaintiffs of the use of § 5 (b) so as not to toll the statute of limitations.
The courts have uniformiy held that the tolling effect of § 5 (b) does not
extend to defendants who were not parties to the Government action. 2 There
was no conflict with this rule in Leh since all the named defendants in the
private case were also defendants in the prior Government proceeding.53
The rule applied by the lower courts in Leh which led to dismissal of the
complaint was that of the Ninth Circuit as expressed in Steiner v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp.:
49 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964).
50 Civil No. 11584-0 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (consent judgment).
51 Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 60 (1965).
52 Sun Theatre Corp. v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 213 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1954); Charles
Rubenstein, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 176 F. Supp. 527 (D. Minn. 1959), aff'd, 289
F.2d 418 (8th Cir. 1961); Levy v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal.
1952); Christensen v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 446 (D. Utah 1950); Momand
v. Universal Film Exch., 43 F. Supp. 996 (D. Mass. 1942), aff'd, 172 F.2d 37 (1st Cir.
1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 967 (1949).
53 The one additional defendant in Leh who was not one in the Government suit had
been dismissed from the case prior to the ruling on the statute of limitations defense. Leh
v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 61 n.4 (1965).
54 232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1956).
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General allegations of conduct in violation of the antitrust laws unrelated
to the same conduct alleged in a public suit are insufficient to toll the
running of a statute of limitations. A greater similarity is needed than
that the same conspiracies are alleged. The same means must be used to
achieve the same objectives of the same conspiracies by the same defendants.
A further basis for this holding is the fact that private civil antitrust actions
are not founded upon the conspiracy, but rather the overt acts done in
furtherance of it causing injury. 55 (Emphasis added.)
This rule was based on the interdependence on § 5(a) and § 5(b) and thus
viewed the scope of § 5 (b) as determined by the principles of collateral estoppel
applicable under § 5(a).6 Thus, the Court's interpretation of § 5(b) in Minnesota Mining "sweeps away much of the foundation for the Steiner view ... of
§ 5(b)."" Even before Minnesota Mining, the Ninth Circuit, while holding
the Steiner test had been met, 8 expressed doubts as to its validity:
Nor, in view of the disposition which we have made of this matter do
we find it necessary to pass upon plaintiff's contention that the Steiner
case was wrongly decided. The cogent arguments made in support of that
contention we leave for determination in some future litigation in which
such a decision may be required.5 9
In view of the Court's opinion of the efficacy of § 5(b), expressed so
thoroughly in Minnesota Mining, it is apparent that the Steiner view would
not appeal to the Court when a further opportunity to interpret the section
was presented. Predictably, the Court accorded more favorable treatment to
the Tenth Circuit's rule formulated in Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v.
Nisley. 0 When Nisley was decided, there was ample authority61 for construing
§ 5 (a) and § 5 (b) as interdependent, but the Nisley court did not think that
they were "necessarily co-extensive in their frame of reference." 62 It did .not
view the tolling provisions of § 5 (b) as confined to or governed by the eviden55 Id. at 196. "[lit is not altogether clear whether Steiner holds that a private claim
for damages must have in common with a Government proceeding identical overt acts on
the part of the defendants ....
[A]t the very least . . . [they] would have to be the same
kind of acts. . . . Any strict requirement of literal identity . . . would render the statute

unworkable in many cases." Wiprud, Antitrust Treble Damage Suits Against Electrical
Manufacturers: The Statute of Limitations and Other Hurdles, 57 Nw. U.L. RaV. 29, 45-46
(1962). In applying this rule the lower court in Leh stated: "[Tlhere were not only different overt acts charged, but different conspiracies, occurring at different times, between
different parties." 330 F.2d 288, 301 (9th Cir. 1964).
56 See notes 38 & 39 supra.
57 Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 59 (1965).
58 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1964).
59 Id. at 219-20 n.58. The district court in Goldwyn, while granting partial summary
judgment for defendants, had held that the Steiner test was not met because there were
additional defendants in the private suit, not parties to the Government suit. "Enough has
been said to show that the tests of the Steiner case . . . are not satisfied by the Goldwyn
complaint." Samual Goldwyn Productions, Inc. v. Fox West Coast Theatres Corp., 146 F.
Supp. 905, 908 (N.D. Cal. 1956). The circuit court in Leh recognized that "the Steiner
case and this circuit seem to go further than other circuits in holding that the words of the
statute 'any matter complained of,' refers to overt acts of the defendants complained of by
the United States in its antitrust proceedings, not just the conspiracy behind the overt acts."
330 F.2d 288, 301 n.15 (9th Cir. 1964).
60 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961), petition for cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 801 (1963).
61 See cases cited note 38 supra.
62 300 F.2d 561, 569 (10th Cir. 1962).
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fiary rules of estoppel necessarily prevalent in § 5 (a).6
court, if Steiner'sinterpretation were accepted:

According to the Nisley

[A] Section 4 plaintiff would be put to the necessity of bringing suit on
the same conspiracy alleged in the government suit, or suffer the bar of
the statute as to every overt act not complained of in the government suit.
This interpretation would lead to a multiplicity of suits with duplication
of proof. It would add to the burdens of the private suitor to the harassment of the defendants. We do not think Congress intended any such
result. Rather, we think Section 5(b), as amended, was intended to
suspend the running of the statute on a Section 4 claim during the pendency
of a government-instituted suit which complained of all, or a part of the
means relied upon by the private plaintiff to effectuate the same general
combination and conspiracy.
These private suits alleged substantially the same conspiracy against
the same defendants as in the government suit. They relied upon the same
documentary and oral proof to establish the conspiracy, and they also
relied "in part" on the same means for the effectuation of the same conspiracy. There was substantial identity of subject matter, and this was
sufficient to suspend the running of the statute.64 (Emphasis added.)
There is no doubt that this test of "substantial identity of subject matter"
is more commensurate with the legislative purposes behind § 5(b) than the
Steiner test. 5 If § 5 (b) were narrowly construed, a well-advised plaintiff would
sue as soon as the filing of the Government suit made it appear that he might
have a cause of action. He would not risk the possibility that the statute of
limitations would be running against his claim during the pendency of the
Government suit. As a consequence, the defendant in the Government suit
would likely find that he was a defendant in many private suits brought by
plaintiffs anxious to protect their rights of action. This could not be the result
which Congress intended."'
The Court, in Leh, while approving of the Nisley view of § 5(b), adopted
what might be termed a "plain meaning" view as to how § 5(b) must be interpreted:
Rather, effect must be given to the broad terms of the statute itself "based in whole or in part on any matter complained of" . . .- read in
light of Congress' "belief that private antitrust litigation is one of the
surest weapons for effective enforcement of the antitrust laws."' 7
This newest interpretation of § 5(b) is in accord with the Court's view that
63 Id. at 570.
64 Ibid.
65 See note 48 supra.
66 Brief for Appellant, Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., pp. 13-14. "Tolling the statute
of limitations protects the plaintiff while his right of action ripens, and rewards him for
withholding his suit at a time when it is the policy of the law to free the defendant from its
annoyance." Christensen v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 446, 454 (D. Utah

1950).

67 Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 59 (1965). Recently the Court has
enumerated the test to be used in determining whether, under a given set of facts, a statute
of limitations is to be tolled: "[Tihe basic inquiry is whether congressional purpose is effectuated by tolling the statute of limitations in given circumstances." Burnet v. New York
Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 427 (1965).
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"government proceedings are recognized as a major source of evidence for
private parties.""8 The Court viewed the disparities between the defendants in
the Standard Oil case and in Leh, and the overlap in the time periods of the
two conspiracies as not affecting the substantial identity of the two complaints.69
"To require more detailed duplication of claims would be to resurrect the
collateral estoppel approach declared in Steiner and rejected by this Court in
Minnesota Mining."7
Although the construction of § 5(b) in Leh will increase the availability
of this section to the private plaintiff, as he pursues his role in the public-private
enforcement of the nation's antitrust laws, it will still be incumbent on a plaintiff
to allege facts in his complaint with a sufficient degree of particularity so that
it may be readily ascertained from a reading of the complaint that his action
is based in whole or in part upon a previous Government proceeding. The
Court will not be able to
resort to guesswork or speculation on what the plaintiff did or did not
intend. The rules of pleading have not been reduced to the degree where
the facts necessary, in whole
or in part, to the plaintiff's case are left for,
71
surmise and conjecture.
On the other hand, the Court's holding that the allegations of the private plaintiff's complaint may be looked at only for reasons of comparison may have
far-reaching implications. "What a private plaintiff may in good faith allege
in his complaint is frequently quite different from what he may ultimately prove,
even in cases where his proof is sufficient to sustain recovery but for the statutory bar. ' 72 It is conceivable that an expert pleader could draft a private treble
damage complaint in such a way as to make its allegations "nontraversable
for purposes of limitations."73 However, this aspect was only given cursory
consideration by the Court in Leh:
Doubtlessly, care must be exercised to insure that reliance upon the
government proceeding is not mere sham and that the matters complained
of in the government suit bear a real relation to the private plaintiff's
claim for relief. But the courts must not allow a legitimate concern that
invocation of § 5(b) be made in good faith to lead them
into a niggardly
74
construction of the statutory language here in question.
Though the effects of the Court's liberal view of § 5 in particular, and
private antitrust litigation in general, remain to be seen - the Leh decision,
68

Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 319

(1965). See Bicks, The Department of Justice and Private Treble Damage Actions, 4
ANTITRUST BULL. 5 (1959); Loevinger, Handling a Plaintiff's Antitrust Damage Suit, 4
ANTITRUST BULL. 29 (1959).

69 Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 63-64 (1965). "In suits of this kind,
the absence of complete identity of defendants may be explained on several grounds unrelated
to the question of whether the private claimant's suit is based on matters of which the Government complained." Ibid.
70 Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 65 (1965).
71 Tague v. Balaban, 146 F. Supp. 356, 359 (N.D. Ill. 1956).

72 Petition for Rehearing, Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., p. 3.
73 Ibid.
74 Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 59 (1965).
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and its predecessor, Minnesota Mining, cannot help but be of benefit to all
future treble-damage suits. Now that an FTC order can operate under § 5 (b)
to suspend the statute of limitations, it is conceivable that "soon an order of
one of its sister agencies may also be considered within the scope of section 5. ' "75
In view of the clear congressional policy in favor of the integral role that
the private plaintiff is to play in the scheme of the public-private enforcement
of the antitrust laws, as shown initially in 1914 by the enactment of § 4 of the
Clayton Act, and subsequently in the 1955 amendments, the Court's decision
in Leh must be viewed as a significant contribution to antitrust law.
Clifford A. Roe, Jr.
EVIDENCE -

'STATUTE GOVERNING

MOTION

FOR

SUPPRESSION

OF

Evi-

DENCE SEIZED UNDER A SEARCH WARRANT CONSTRUED To PERMIT INQUIRY

INTO TRUTHFULNESS OF FACTS ALLEGED IN AFFIDAVIT UPON WHICH THE
WARRANT WAS IsSUED - Patrolman Ralph secured a search warrant to
examine the premises occupied by the defendant to obtain evidence on a violation of a New York Penal Law provision forbidding policy gambling.' The
warrant was issued, based only on the officer's sworn testimony that a confidential informant had told him of placing bets with the defendant at that
location and that the officer himself had observed persons at the defendant's
apartment handing him money and slips of paper. The issuing magistrate
made no inquiry into the officer's observations or the informant's reliability.
The New York City Criminal Court granted the defendant's pretrial motion
to suppress evidence alleged by defendant to have been procured through an
unlawful search.2 This resulted from the testimony of defendant's wife and
another witness that defendant was not at the apartment at any of the times
the officer allegedly observed him. On appeal by the People, the Appellate
Term reversed and ordered a new hearing because the Criminal Court had
made no findings of fact.' The New York Court of Appeals, Chief Judge Desmond giving the opinion, held: the New York Code should be construed to
permit an inquiry as to whether the search warrant affidavit's statements were
perjurious.4 People v. Alfinito, 16 N.Y.2d 181, 211 N.E.2d 644, 264 N.Y.S.2d
243 (1965).
75 Matteoni, An Antitrust Argument: Whether A Federal Trade Commission Order Is
Within The Ambit of the Clayton Act's Section 5, 40 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 158, 169 (1965).
"Section 11 [of the Clayton Act] permits the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal
Communications Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal Reserve Board,
where antitrust transgressions arise in the areas under their special jurisdiction,
enforce sections 2, 3, 7 and 8 of the Clayton Act." Ibid.

to also

I N. Y. PEN. LAW § 974-75 (1944).
2 People v. Alfinito, Crim. No. 1340, New York City Mun. Ct. (1964).
3 Decision not reported.
4 Two other issues were present in the case. Assuming that the facts set forth in the
affidavit are subject to inquiry, who has the burden of proof on a motion to suppress evidence
obtained under a search warrant valid on its face where the defendant alleges that probable
cause was lacking? This is a crucial question since a successful motion to suppress the warrant
often dooms the prosecution to failure as much of its case often rests upon evidence procured
during such a search. While the Supreme Court has never ruled on this point, two important

cases do give the outline of the present law on the subject. In Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160 (1949), which involved a search without a warrant, the Court assumed that the
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A search warrant is an order in writing, in the name of the people (or
the state or commonwealth, according to local practice), signed by a magistrate,
and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property
and bring it before a magistrate.5 Search warrants appear to have been un-

known at common law.' The original search warrants, issued under Charles
II,7 were called writs of assistance. They were blanket authorizations to customs
agents for searches of any place on mere suspicion. James Otis referred to
them as "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of
English liberty and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in
an English law book."' As a result of this experience, the fourth amendment
was included in the Constitution to prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.'
Government had the burden of proof in showing probable cause, as well as proof necessary
to establish guilt. On the other hand, in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), which
involved a search conducted under a warrant valid on its face, the Court held that the party
challenging the validity of the search should carry the burden of proving its invalidity. Without
question, the general rule is that the party seeking to invalidate the warrant has the burden
of showing that the warrant was in fact invalid, and so any evidence obtained under its
authority would be inadmissible. E.g., Anderson v. United States, 344 F.2d 792 (8th Cir.
1965); State v. Coolidge, 106 N.H. 186, 208 A.2d 322 (1965); People v. Catrambone, 41
Misc.2d 282, 245 N.Y.S.2d 742 (Sup. Ct. 1963). To this rule there are certain exceptions.
Where the evidence sought to be admitted was seized without a warrant, the burden is on
the government, be it state or federal, to establish that there was probable cause for the
search. E.g., United States v. Rivera, 321 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1963); Plazola v. United States,
291 F.2d 56 '(9th Cir. 1961); People v. Allen, 45 Misc.2d 739, 257 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup.
Ct. 1965). Where the attack is on the grounds that a warrant was issued where there was
less than probable cause, it is the defendant who must sustain the burden of proof. Two
other exceptions to the general rule exist. Where the search is based on consent, the burden
of proving consent to search and seizure is on the government. See United States v. Hilbrich,
341 F.2d 555 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 941 (.1965); United States v. Gregory, 204
F. Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). It must also show that the consent was unequivocal and
voluntary, free from duress and coercion. See United States v. Roche, 36 F.R.D. 413 (D. Conn.
1965). The final exception to the rule is that where the defendant is successful and shows
that the search was in fact illegal, the government has the burden of showing that any other
evidence presented by it had an origin independent of the illegal search. See United States
v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. Lipshitz, 132 F. Supp. 519
(E.D.N.Y. 1955). The motion to suppress evidence is to be made prior to the trial, but in
the absence of such motion a district court, in its discretion, may entertain an objection to the
evidence at the trial. See Gilbert v. United States, 307 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1962); but see
United States v. Nicholas, 319 F.2d 697 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 933 (1963) (motion
held to be untimely). Therefore, the Alfinito decision, which placed the burden of proof on
the person attacking the warrant is consistent with nearly all precedent on the subject.
The Alfinito holding that any fair doubt arising from testimony at the suppressal hearing
should be resolved in favor of the warrant since those allegations have already been examined
by a judicial officer in issuing the warrant is also in complete agreement with modern thinking
on the subject. In federal courts, there is a presumption that the United States Commissioner
has properly performed his duty in issuing the search warrant. United States v. Haskins, 345
F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1965). Issuing state officials have the benefit of the same presumption. State
v. Kelly, 99 Ariz. 136, 407 P.2d 95 (1965). Likewise, a presumption of regularity attends actions
of policemen. Chappell v. United States, 342 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1965). State v. Tacker,
407 P.2d 851 (Ore. 1965), held that though in a particular case it may not be easy to
determine when an affidavit for a search warrant demonstrates the existence of probable
cause, resolution of doubtful or marginal cases should be largely determined by a preference
to be accorded to the warrant. This is a typical court reaction in doubtful cases.
5 Camden County Beverage Co. v. Blair, 46 F.2d 648 (D.N.J. 1930).
6 Buckley v. Beaulieu, 104 Me. 56, 71 Atl. 70 (1908).
7 An act to prevent frauds and concealments of his Majesty's customs and subsidies, 12
Car. 2, c. 19 (1660).
8

COOLEY ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 368 (5th

ed. 1883).

9 The fourth amendment denounces only such searches and seizures as are "unreasonable," and is to be construed in light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure
when it was adopted and in a manner to conserve public interests as well as the rights of
individuals. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. '2132 (1925). The states likewise followed
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Whether a search is unreasonable involves a substantive determination
turning on the circumstances presented by the particular situation."0 An unreasonable search has been defined as an examination or inspection of one's
premises or person without authority of law for the purpose of discovering
stolen, contraband or illicit property, or for some evidence of guilt to be used
in prosecution of a criminal action.1 The right protected by the fourth amend-

ment is the right to feel secure in one's home from unwarranted intrusions by
law enforcement officers.

Today, emphasis has shifted from protection of the right to privacy and
security to protection of the individual from the use of illegally seized evidence

in a trial. In Weeks v. United States, 2 the Supreme Court held that in a
federal prosecution, the fourth amendment barred the use of evidence secured
through an illegal search and seizure. 3 The Weeks rule reached its logical
extension in Mapp v. Ohio, 4 which held that all evidence obtained by searches
and seizures in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in a state court.
This decision followed closely on the heels of another Supreme Court decision"
which overruled the "silver platter" doctrine of Lustig v. United States," by
which evidence illegally seized by state officials was excluded from the federal
courts only if federal officers had participated in the search. As the result of
these three decisions, any evidence illegally obtained by any officer of the law
is inadmissible in any court.
For issuance of a search warrant, certain essentials are required. Searches
conducted under the authority of a search warrant issued in full compliance
with all of the constitutional requirements are not unreasonable and so are
not prohibited by the Constitution.' A search warrant can be issued only on
information obtained prior to issuance, and its validity must rest on the affidavits
made at that time.'" A search warrant must usually be issued upon the authority
of a written affidavit sufficient on its face to show the existence of probable
cause for a belief that a crime has been committed and that evidence in relation
to that crime may be secured by a search of the place named in the affidavit."
The warrant is not lawfully issued unless the grounds upon which it is based
are supported by the oath or affirmation of the complaining party.2"

Both state and federal constitutions require that a search warrant must
suit in limiting permissible searches by state law enforcement officers. See, e.g., COLO. CONST.
art. II, § 7. See also the relevant state constitutional provisions in INDEX DIGEST OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 921 (2d ed. 1959).

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

State v. Contursi, 44 N.J. 422, 209 A.2d 829 (1965).
People v. De Cesare, 220 Mich. 417, 190 N.W. 302 (1922).
232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Ibid.
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
338 U.S. 74 (1949).
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
In re Phoenix Cereal Beverage Co., 58 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1932).
State v. Conwell, 96 Me. 172, 51 Adt. 873 (1902). See also statutes cited note 9

supra.

20 State v. Griswold, 67 Conn. 290, 34 Atl. 1046 (1896). At common law, justices of the
peace had the general authority to issue search warrants for stolen goods. Jones v. German,
2 Q.B. 417 (1897).

However, a recent case held that the issuance of a search warrant is not

subject to delegation to a trial commissioner and any such warrant so issued is void. Slone
v. Commonwealth, 377 S.W.2d 51 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964).

RECENT DECISIONS
contain a particular description of the place or premises to be searched.2 If
the affiant's name is not stated in the supporting affidavit, the warrant is fatally
defective." This requirement makes someone responsible for the facts alleged
and enables an aggrieved person to probe and challenge the warrant's legality.
Search warrants must also particularly describe the thing to be seized with such
certainty so that the officer charged with execution will be left with no discretion respecting the property to be taken. 2
The major requirement is probable cause. What constitutes probable cause
seems incapable of precise definition. It is less than certainty or proof, but more
than suspicion or possibility.24 Facts alleged to show probable cause are sufficient if they would warrant a prudent and cautious man in believing an offense
has been committed.2 5 Probable cause has been defined as the existence of
such facts and circumstances as would excite an honest belief in a reasonable
mind, acting on all the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the
issuing magistrate, that the charge made by the applicant for the warrant is
true.28 Under the majority rule,2" an affidavit or verified complaint, to be
sufficient, must be so definite that the accuser will be liable in an action for
damages s or guilty of perjury if it be false in any material allegation.29
There is a diversity of views on whether or not a court will allow the
affiant to base his belief on hearsay. A majority will allow such affidavits based
on information and belief," but other courts require a statement of the facts
and sources of information upon which the belief is based. 2 ' At any rate, the
affiant's information must be shown to be based on more than rumor or
2
suspicion.1

The issue in Alfinito was whether or not the truth of the facts alleged in
the affidavit upon which the warrant was issued were challengeable by the
accused. This is related to the problem of whether or not the issuing magistrate's

determination of probable cause is reviewable."s As a general rule, if one can
21 Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
22 E.g., King v. United States, 282 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1960); Howard v. State, 199 Md.
529, 87 A.2d 161 "(1952).
23 E.g., Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); United States v. Guido, 251 F.2d
1 (7th Cir. 1958).
24 Goodman v. State, 178 Md.1, 11 A.2d 635 (1940).
25 E.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Goodman v. State, 178 Md. 1,
11 A.2d 635 (1940). See also Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435 (1925).
26 Goodman v. State, 178 Md. 1, 11 A.2d 635 (1940).
27 While a majority rule is perceptible, there is a wide divergence of views taken on the
matter of issuance of search warrants generally. See Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 527 (1965).
28 E.g., Wallace v. State, 199 Ind. 317, 157 N.E. 657 (1927); Sullivan v. Commonwealth,
304 Ky. 780, 202 S.W.2d 619 (1947).
29 E.g., People v. Savanna Lodge No. 1095, Loyal Order Of Moose, 344 Ill. App. 278,
100 N.E.2d 632 (1951); Burns v. State, 92 Okla. Cr. 24, 220 P.2d 473 (1950).
30 E.g., . ugendort v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964); Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257 (1960); Galena v. Municipal Court, 47 Cal. Rptr. 88, 237 Cal. App. 2d 684 (1965).
31 E.g., Duncan v. Commonwealth, 297 Ky. 217, 179 S.W.2d 899 (1944); Allen v. State,
178 Md. 269, 13 A.2d 352 (1940).
32 E.g., Walker v. Commonwealth, 261 S.W.2d 635 (Ky. 1953); Elardo v. State, 164
Miss. 628, 145 So. 615 (1933). For a collection of the various holdings on the probable cause
requirement, see Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 605 (1950). Probable cause for a search arises out of the
"total atmosphere of the case" which includes the affiant's personal knowledge, informers,
character and so forth. State v. Tanzola, 83 N.J. Super. 40, 198 A.2d 811 (1964).
33 The two situations are distinguishable. In the Alfinito case, the attack was on the
truth of the facts in the affidavits, but in this situation, the problem is whether or not an
affidavit valid on its face presented probable cause for issuance of a warrant.
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be drawn from the maze of divergent cases, in a federal proceeding to contravert or quash a search warrant, the commissioner's determination of facts
tending to show probable cause is unreviewable since he is acting in a judicial
capacity."4 His finding is conclusive unless arbitrary. 5 Other cases have held,
however, that in reviewing the commissioner's determination of probable cause,
the court must make its own judgment on the basis of information brought to
the commissioner's attention by the affidavit or otherwise."6
Just as there is no real consensus in federal courts, it is also difficult to
formulate a general rule from state court decisions. Some hold the court must
determine whether the statutory procedure has been substantially followed
and whether the court issuing the search warrant had sufficient grounds upon
which to base its decision." However, it is generally held that, though in a
particular case it may be difficult to determine when the affidavit demonstrates
the existence of probable cause, resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in
the area should largely be determined by the preference accorded to such
warrants.3
Some state courts hold that appellate courts, in reviewing the
issuing judge's determination of probable cause, must affirm if there is substantial basis for that determination. 9 Others hold that since the decision finding
probable cause involves a mixed question of constitutional law and fact, and
the appellate court is the arbiter of constitutional issues, it must make an independent appraisal of the facts and circumstances in each case to determine
whether the magistrate who issued the warrant could reasonably have found
from the proof before him that there was a sufficient showing of probable
cause.4" In some, but not all jurisdictions, the legality of a search warrant may
be questioned or reviewed by a motion to quash. In such cases, many jurisdictions view the magistrate's ruling in denying the motion as final and conclusive with respect to the defendant's right to attack the warrant for lack of
probable cause. 1 However, other courts feel the fact that a magistrate's seal
appears on a search warrant does not preclude the court from inquiring into
its issuance.4
There are a multitude of ways a search warrant may be attacked. While
34 E.g., United States v. Nagle, 34 F.2d 952 (2d. Cir. 1929) ; United States v. Ephraim,
8 F.2d 512 (1st Cir. 1925). Of course, any questions of law involved in the issuance are
reviewable. Giles v. United States, 284 Fed. 208 (1st Cir. 1922).
35 E.g., United States v. Brunett, 53 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1931); United States v. Nagle,
34 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1929). See also People v. Sullivan, 40 Misc. 2d 278, 242 N.Y.S.2d 988
(N.Y. City Ct. 1963).
36 E.g., Schoeneman v. United States, 317 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1963); United States v.
Romano, 241 F. Supp. 933 (D. Me. 1965).
37 E.g., State v. Kelly, 99 Ariz. 136, 407 P.2d 95 (1965); Booze v. State, 390 P.2d 691
(Okla. 1964).
38 E.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) ; State v. Tacker, 407 P.2d 851
(Ore. 1965).
39 E.g., State v. DeNegris, 153 Conn. 5, 212 A.2d 894 (1965); State v. Tacker, 407 P.2d
851 (Ore. 1965). Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common
law pleading rules have no proper place in this area. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S.
102 (1965) ; State v. Tacker, 407 P.2d 851 (Ore. 1965).
40 E.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); People v. Fino, 14 N.Y.2d 160,
199 N.E.2d 151, 250 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1964).
41 People v. Prisco, 36 Misc. 2d 357, 232 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Cy. Ct. 1962).
42 E.g., People v. Keener, 191 Cal. App. 2d 62, 12 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1961).
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the decisions lack harmony, certain distinct approaches are distinguishable."
A motion for return of illegally seized property, while usually allowed in federal
courts, are disallowed in many state jurisdictions.44 An original suit for return
of seized goods and a quashing of the warrant or a preliminary motion to quash
the warrant are also available remedies.4" A motion to vacate, an objection to
the introduction of evidence obtained by a search warrant, and a writ of prohibition may be the appropriate remedy, depending upon the jurisdiction. Finally,
although a writ of habeas corpus is usually available in federal courts, it is often
unavailable in state courts."
Decisions on the question of whether or not averments in an application
for a search warrant can be controverted reveal a definite split between federal
and state rulings, neither group being even internally harmonious. As a general
rule - if one can truly be found - if the warrant is valid on its face, no attack
upon it can be made by the accused.' Mississippi goes even further and holds
43 At common law, there was no appeal from the action of a magistrate in issuing search
warrants. United States v. Maresca, 266 Fed. 713 (2d Cir. 1920). See United States v.
Setaro, 37 F.2d 134 (2d
-ir.1930) (in federal courts, such seized property must be returned
on proper application); United States v. Leiser, 16 F.R.D. 199 (D. Mass. 1954) (propriety
of seizure may be attacked by owner seeking to recover his property). But see Application of
Silfa, 18 Misc.2d 800, 162 N.Y.S.2d 75 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (in some state courts, public officials
will not be compelled to return such property if it is being held in good faith to be used
as evidence in a court). Other cases allow different remedies. See Dowling v. Collins, 10
F.2d (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 660 (1926) (preliminary motion to quash warrant
or original suit for return of property); In re Search Warrant of Premises 781 Midland Ave.,
Yonkers, 39 Misc.2d 802, 242 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (motion to vacate may always
be used to test propriety of seizure in rem); Bailey v. State, 157 Tex. Cr. 315, 248 S.W.2d 144
(1952) (objection to introduction of evidence). A common holding is that the decision to issue
the search warrant may be questioned only in the manner prescribed by statute and where
that is not done, the defendant is precluded from controverting the facts stated in the affidavit
upon which the warrant was issued. People v. Nelson, 171 Cal. App. 2d 356, 340 P.2d 718
(1959). In at least one instance, a state court has held that a writ of habeas corpus by a
state supreme court could not be used by an accused to challenge the admissibility of evidence
allegedly seized illegally. In re Sterling, 47 Cal. Rptr. 205, 407 P.2d 5 (1965). However, in
In re Harris, 16 Cal. Rptr. 889, 366 P.2d 305 (1961), the court said, "If the violation of a
petitioner's constitutional rights by the use of illegally seized evidence had any bearing on the
issue of his guilt, there should be no doubt that habeas corpus would be available." 16 Cal.
Rptr. at 892, 366 P.2d 305, 308 (1961). A final instance where the issue of the legality
may arise is in the situation where there is by statute, criminal liability of an affiant for malicious procurement of a search warrant, IowA CoDa ANN. § 751.38 (1950), a magistrate for
issuing a warrant without supporting affidavit, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 '(1953), an officer
willfully exceeding the authority of the search warrant, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 933.17 (1944), or
an officer with either an invalid warrant or no warrant at all, IDAHO CODR ANN. § 18-703
(1948). For other statutes, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961).
44 See, e.g., United States v. Setaro, 37 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1930); Application of Silva,
18 Misc.2d 800, 162 N.Y.S.2d 75 (Cy. Ct. 1957).
45 E.g., Dowling v. Collins, 10 F.2d 62 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 660 (1926);
In re Search Warrant of Premises 781 Midland Ave., Yonkers, 39 Misc.2d 802, 242 N.Y.S.2d
139 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
46 The question of who may challenge the warrant presents less of a problem. While one
court has held that any interested person may controvert probable cause for issuing a warrant,
People v. Kempner, 208 N.Y. 16, 101 N.E. 794 (1913), another has held that one whose home
has been invaded by virtue of a search warrant issued without sufficient facts, may make a
motion to vacate. People v. Politana, 17 App. Div.2d 503, 235 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1962). The
usual case holds that the owner of goods seized by illegal search and seizure has standing to
raise the objection, even though the premises searched were not his. E.g., United States v.
Walker, 197 F.2d 287 '(2d. Cir.), aert. denied, 344 U.S. 877 (1952); State v. Wade, 89
N.J. Super. 139, 214 A.2d 411 (1965).
47 E.g., Tischler v. State, 206 Md. 386, 111 A.2d 655 (1955); Armstrong v. State, 195
Miss. 300, 15 So. 2d 438 (1943); Johnson v. State, 163 Tex. Crim. 101, 289 S.W.2d 249
(1956).
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that the whole question of the sufficiency of the affidavit is concluded by the
decision of the issuing magistrate.4" Cornelius has summarized this position:
The defendant at the trial may not dispute or controvert the averments
in the affidavit for the search warrant for the purpose of invalidating the
search, nor may he cross-examine the person who made the affidavit as
to the truth of such averments.4 9
He further explained:
Some courts have held that, unless the statute otherwise provides as for
example the federal code, that where an affidavit is filed or testimony
taken for the issuance of a search warrant and the affidavit or testimony
makes out a prima facie case of probable cause, the same cannot be controverted or disputed and the warrant thereby nullified. The cases have
even gone so far as to hold that the complainant himself will not be allowed
to dispute the truth of the averments he made in the affidavit so as to
vitiate a criminal warrant and where a statute required the affidavit to
be made by a reputable citizen the defendant will not be permitted to
go behind the face of the affidavit and show that it was not so made.50
Courts have held that the accused cannot inquire as to whether or not the facts
stated in the affidavit were known to the affiant at the time he made the affidavit,5 ' nor if they were based on information or belief.52 Other courts have
held that the accused cannot question the means by which the affiant's knowledge was gained,53 although there is some authority to the contrary on this
point.54 Where the affidavit is required to be made by a credible person, the
accused cannot attack the warrant collaterally by showing that the affiant was
not such a person.55 Where states have statutes which allow the affidavits to be
challenged by the accused, the statutory procedure must be strictly followed."
48 Armstrong v. State, 195 Miss. 300, 15 So. 2d 438 (1943). See also People v. Sullivan,
40 Misc. 2d 278, 242 N.Y.S.2d 988 (Cy. Ct. 1963).
49 CORNELIUS, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 428-29 (2d ed. 1930).
50 Id. at 425-27. Lest one feel that only pre-Mapp cases arrive at this conclusion, witness
Dunn v. Municipal Court, 34 Cal. Rptr. 251, 220 Cal. App. 2d 917 (1963) and Jackson v.
State, 365 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 956 '(1963), holding
that a reviewing court can only invalidate a search warrant if the supporting affidavit fails
as a matter of law, where the warrant is not otherwise defective and that a trial court may
not go behind the affidavit and search warrant to determine the falsity of facts stated therein
in order to invalidate a search warrant valid on its face and such rule applies where the affiant's
testimony is relied upon to show the falsity of his affidavit for the issuance of the search
warrant and also where the testimony of other witnesses is relied on to show the falsity of
such affidavit. United States v. Nagle, 34 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1929), held that the existence
of probable cause cannot be negatived by the mere denial by a defendant of the facts sworn
to in the affidavit.
51 E.g., Southard v. State, 297 P.2d 585 (Okla. 1956); Head v. Commonwealth, 199
Ky. 222, 250 S.W. 848 (1923).
52 E.g., Cahill v. State, 38 Okla. Cr. 236, 260 Pac. 91 (1927); Dikes v. State, 120 Tex. Cr.
127, 48 S.W.2d 259 (1932).
53 E.g., Thornton v. Commonwealth, 245 Ky. 336, 53 S.W.2d 707 (1932); Nance v.
State, 50 Okla. Cr. 17, 294 Pac. 1097 (1931).
54 E.g., White v. Commonwealth, 221 Ky. 535, 299 S.W. 168 (1927); People v. Brown,
40 Misc. 2d 35, 242 N.Y.S.2d 555 (N.Y. City Ct. 1963).
55 Torres v. State, 161 Tex. Cr. 480, 278 S.W.2d 853 (1955).
56 E.g., People v. Peterson, 43 Cal. Rptr. 457, 233 Cal. App. 2d 481 (1965); People v.
Brown, 40 Misc. 2d 35, 242 N.Y.S.2d 555 (N.Y. City Ct. 1963). In some states the state
legislatures have seen fit to remove this problem from the judiciary and have enacted
legislation specifically allowing the validity of the warrant to be attacked by the accused. As
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Although the majority of state courts have held that the aggrieved person
cannot challenge the truthfulness of facts alleged by the affiant or the existence
of probable cause, the rule is otherwise in federal courts. In the federal system,
false facts given by the affiant vitiate the search warrant." Although the Supreme
Court, in Rugendorf v. United States,5" stated that it had never directly passed
on the extent to which a court may permit an inquiry into the facts when the
search warrant is valid on its face and when the allegations of the underlying
affidavit established probable cause, it assumed an attack upon the truthfulness
of the affidavit could be made. Federal Rule 41 (e) provides that on a motion
for the return of seized property or to suippress evidence, "the judge shall
receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion." 9
The procedures provided for in Rule 41 (e) are supplemented by the rule of
State v. Hurst,6" which held that one convicted by illegally seized evidence could
seek habeas corpus in federal courts to secure a discharge long after conviction
became final. 6
The interpretation placed on the New York Criminal Procedure statute
in Alfinito is in line with the more modem thinking on the subject. As Chief
Judge Desmond correctly stated:
Modem thought which produced the decision in Mapp v. Ohio .. .would
make incongruous any holding that a search warrant is beyond attack
even on proof that the allegations on which it was based were perjured.
Our duty is to fashion a rule which will prevent such a violation of the
citizen's rights and at the same time avoid creating a situation where
the Alfinito case points out, New York is one of these states. NEw YORK CODE OF Calm.
PRoc. § 813(c) provides:
A person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure and having
reasonable grounds to believe that the property, papers or things, hereinafter referred
to as property, claimed to have been unlawfully obtained may be used as evidence
against him in a criminal proceeding, may move for the return of such property
or for the suppression of its use as evidence. The court shall hear evidence upon

any issue of fact necessary to determination of the motion....

See also, People v. Nelson, 171 Cal. App. 2d 356, 340 P.2d 718 (1959).
57 E.g., King v. United States, 282 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1960); United States v. Nagle, 34
F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1929).
58 376 U.S. 528, 531-32 (1964).
59 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) provides:
Motion for Return of Property and to Suppress Evidence. A person aggrieved by
an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court for the district in which
the property was seized for the return of the property and to suppress for the use
as evidence anything so obtained on the ground that (1) the property was illegally
seized without warrant, or (2) the warrant is insufficient on its face, or (3) the
property seized is not that described in the warrant, or (4) there was not probable
cause for believing the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was issued,
or (5) the warrant was illegally executed. The judge shall receive evidence on any
issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion.
This rule expressly superseded the Federal Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, which provided:
"If the grounds on which the warrant was issued be controverted, the judge or commissioner
must proceed to take testimony in relation thereto, and the testimony of each witness must be
reduced to writing and subscribed by each witness." Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat.
228, 229 (1917). Rule 41 is not as explicit, but appears to achieve the same result.
60 325 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1964).
61 Ibid. Similarly, Circuit Judge Marshall, dissenting in United States v. Fay, 333 F.2d
12 (2d Cir. 1964), said: "If a state court should nevertheless admit such evidence [illegally
seized evidence] in a post-Mapp trial, no one could possibly contend that federal habeas
corpus would not lie." 333 F.2d at 27. This would appear to substantiate the federal view
previously stated.
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overstrict rules would invalidate numerous warrants simply because witnesses can later be found to swear to the opposite of what the officer
swore when he procured the warrant.62
Holding that the statute is to be construed to permit inquiry into whether or
not the statements in the affidavit were perjurious fashions just such a rule.
There are valid reasons on both sides of the problem of whether or not
the issuance of a search warrant should be challengeable, either generally by a
charge that there was no probable cause or specifically that the facts alleged
were in fact false. The major argument against allowing the defendant to attack
the issuance of a warrant was expressed by one court in the following manner:
To our minds, any other rule would not only bring about confusion and
disorder in determining the competency of evidence procured under search
warrants valid upon their face and predicated upon affidavits from which
the magistrate could determine that "probable cause" was shown, but
in many cases the issue of defendant's guilt or innocence would be lost
sight of in an inquiry whether affants had committed perjury in making
the affidavit upon which the search warrant was based, although upon
its face the affidavit was sufficient and perfectly regular. In such cases it
seems that orderly trials must63postpone investigation of affiant's good faith
to another time and tribunal.
An attack on a search warrant was struck down in a similar case where the
court said:
Any other rule would encourage unauthorized attacks upon the correctness or truth of statements contained in such affidavits, and would bring
about intenninable confusion and disorder in determining the competency
of evidence procured under search warrants valid upon their faces.6 4
There is no doubt that such attacks on the warrant would take more of the
courts' time, already at a premium, and hence increase the cost of administering
a judicial system which is already expensive.
Law enforcement officers also are against subjecting the warrant to attack
because they feel there is a very real danger that their sources of information
may be exposed and thus eliminated. The ability of enforcement officials to
give an informer appropriate assurances of anonymity is often an essential
prerequisite to inducing his assistance and cooperation. Depriving the law
enforcement community of the ability to give such assurances could swiftly
choke off sources of information. If the officer were required to divulge the
sources of his confidential information, "the ultimate and undoubted effect
would be to discourage informants and to make the protection of the public
very much more difficult than it is."6 Attorney General Jackson regarded "the
keeping of faith with confidential informants as an indispensable condition of
62 People v. Alfinito, 16 N.Y.2d 181, 211 N.E.2d 644, 264 N.Y.S.2d 243, 246 (1965).
63 Ware v. State, 110 Tex. Cr. 114, 7 S.W.2d 551, 554 (1928).
64 Bowen v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 400, 251 S.W. 625 (1923).
65 1959 CRIM. L. REv. 16. It can readily be seen why law enforcement officers seek liberal
standards of probable cause on which search warrants may be issued. In 1965, the number
of murders in the United States increased by 6% over the previous year, robbery by 5% and
crime of all types increased by 8% in the suburbs. Time, March 18, 1966, p. 29.
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[the F.B.I.'s] future efficiency." 6 In the more serious criminal cases, the informant literally risks his life in volunteering information. "Once an informant
is known," Mr. Justice Clark observed in Roviaro v. United States," "the drug
traffickers are quick to retaliate. Dead men tell no tales. The old penalty of
tongue removal, once visited upon the informer Larunda, has been found
obsolete."'8
The only time the basis for issuance of a warrant will be challenged is
where the search has ultimately borne fruitful results. Only if some incriminating evidence has been found will the accused even challenge the warrant
and then such evidence will not be admitted when it can be shown that it was
illegally obtained. Thus, there is little possibility of bringing about a true miscarriage of justice. While we are not willing to allow law enforcement officers
to use techniques usually associated with the criminal element or tyranny,
there is some strength to this argument that there is very little danger of convicting an innocent party even where the basis for the issuance of the search
warrant is questionable. Chief Judge Traynor has said:
Unlike the denial of the right to counsel, the knowing use of perjured
testimony or suppression of evidence, the use of an involuntary confession,
or as in this case, the denial of an opportunity to present a defense, the
use of illegally seized evidence carries with it no risk of convicting an innocent person .... The risk that the deterrent effect of the rule will be compromised by an occasional erroneous decision refusing to apply it is far
outweighed by the disruption of the orderly administration of justice that
would ensue if
the issue could be relitigated over and over again on col69
lateral attack.
Admittedly the success or failure of a search is immaterial to the question of
whether probable cause existed for issuance of the warrant. A search is not
made lawful by virtue of what it turns up."0 But there is no reason why the
condition and characteristics of the items uncovered in a search may not be
used to confirm the authenticity of the affidavit made prior to the event."'
Although there are compelling reasons why courts should not allow a
subsequent attack on the issuance of the search warrant, there are even more
compelling reasons for allowing the determination of probable cause and the
truthfulness of the facts alleged in the affidavit to be controverted. The fourth
amendment is evidence of our commitment to the principle that blanket search
warrants issued on mere suspicion are not to be tolerated. The right protected
is really twofold: it is the right to the privacy and security in one's home and
5 the
it is also the right against self-incrimination."2 In Standford v. State,"
66 40 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 45, 46-47 (1949).
67 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
68 Id. at 67. But see Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964).
69 In re Harris, 56 Cal. 2d 879, 883-84, 16 Cal. Rptr. 889, 892, 366 P.2d 305, 308 (1961).
70 See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
71 See Brief for Appellee, p. 46, People v. Alfinito, 16 N.Y.2d 181, 211 N.E.2d 64, 264
N.Y.S.2d 243 (1965).
72 The fifth amendment states that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law...." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
73 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
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Supreme Court held that the first, fourth and fifth amendments to the Constitution are related and safeguard not only privacy and protection against selfincrimination but conscience, human dignity and freedom of expression as well.
The Court, in Boyd v. United States,7 4 considered the fourth and fifth amendments as "running almost into each other."75 In Mapp v. Ohio,7 6 the Court
used both of these amendments to reach its decision. Other recent cases have
emphasized the increased commitment to the principle of protecting individual
rights. In Gideon v. Wainwright,7 the Court held that the appointment of
counsel is a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial. Escobedo v. Illinois,7
where the Court made affirmative advice to an arrestee of his right to counsel
before taking his confession a prerequisite to its later admissibility, is another
recent example of this commitment to protecting individual rights. We want
to give an accused every possible chance to prove his innocence. The requirement of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" is only part of this commitment.
The main argument for allowing the defendant to challenge the validity
of a warrant is that it will curb overzealous officers from acting upon mere
suspicion. Law enforcement officers are quick to learn when courts will not
acquiesce in their procedures. Therefore, to allow the warrant to be challenged
will mean that enforcement officers will have to be more thorough in their
investigations. It has been said that "the ignoble shortcut to conviction left
open to the State [referring to the use of illegally obtained evidence] tends to
destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of
the people rest." 7" Likewise, by allowing enforcement officers to use a perjured
affidavit to procure a search warrant would be aiding in the deterioration of
the law enforcement community itself. When any police force can use such
shortcuts, it becomes lazy and less efficient. Coerced confessions and illegally
seized evidence are types of enforcement shortcuts which can and do corrode
our judicial system."0 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court in Mc1
Nabb v. United States,"
said:
A democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is central,
naturally guards against the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal
in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cherished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled that
safeguards must be8 2provided against the dangers of the overzealous as
well as the despotic.

The final argument, and perhaps ultimately the most persuasive, is that
74

116 U.S. 616 (1886).

75

Id. at 630.

76 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
77 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
78 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
79 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
80 This is one reason that coerced confessions are not condoned. Glueck, after scholarly
investigation, found "that such methods, [referring to the so-called "third degree"] aside from
their brutality, tend in the long run to defeat their own purpose; they encourage inefficiency on
the part of the police." GLUECK, CRIME AND JUSTICE 76 (1936).
81 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
82 Id. at 343.
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the lie should not be more effective than the fist. In Mapp the evidence ultimately held to be inadmissible was obtained by knocking down a door to enter
the defendant's house.8" If such evidence is inadmissible, is there any justification for a different result where entrance was gained and the evidence then
obtained by a police officer committing perjury? There can be but one answer
-in both cases the evidence should be inadmissible. Given our commitment
to the principle that law enforcement officers are not free to enter private
premises to search at their whim, we cannot condone such activity. In Mapp,
the defendant was allowed to introduce evidence showing the policeman's illegal
entry-the defendant in the Alfinito situation should likewise "be permitted
to effectuate his constitutional rights by being afforded an opportunity to prove
that the policeman submitted a perjured or recklessly false affidavit." 4
One may easily realize how various state and federal courts could arrive
at diametrically opposed decisions. On the one hand is the interest in effective
law enforcement and on the other the protection of individual rights. There
is possibly no answer to the argument that to allow such challenges to statements in the affidavits upon which search warrants are based would take an
endless amount of time and hopelessly confuse the issues in a case. However,
as in many areas of the law, the competing interests must be balanced. Given
our commitment to the protection of individual rights, even in the face of what
appears, at times, to be more effective means of law enforcement, the balancing
must ultimately result in the decision reached in Alfinito. The rights of the
individual must prevail. The Supreme Court, in Mapp, has made perhaps
the most appropriate argument for the Alfinito decision. It said:
Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe
its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the character of its own existence.
As Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, said in Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 485 (1928): "Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.
...If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law;
it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."
Nor can it lightly be assumed that, as a practical matter, adoption of the
exclusionary rule fetters law enforcement.8

5

The policy adopted by the Court of Appeals of New York in Alfinito protects
the individual from unreasonable searches and seizures and insures that the
law enforcement officials will not become overzealous or lazy in their investigative procedures.
John W. Nelson
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